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Globalization has economic and social implications, particularly for Third 
World countries. The Arab countries, being part of the latter group, are 
subject to those likely impacts. The objective of this paper is to assess the 
most important economic and social implications of globalization on the 
Arab countries, and to suggest appropriate policies that can be applied to 
reduce the negative impacts, and maximize the positive ones, on those 
countries.  
 
This study will focus on assessing the likely impacts of 
globalization on economic growth (and sectoral structure) in the Arab 
countries, and their vulnerability. Two aspects of the countries￿ 
vulnerability will be investigated in the study: (i) the implications of 
globalization on the evolution of the countries￿ international trade relative 
to their GNP; and (ii) the implications for the financial markets and their 
likely impact on the countries￿ economies. With regard to the social 
implications of  globalization, we shall be concerned with their potential 
impact on employment and poverty.  
 
  From a socio-economic perspective, the Arab countries are not 
homogenous in many respects. There are considerable differences among 
them in economic size and structure, population size, income per capita, 
balance of payments, labour market, poverty, etc. Such differences will be 
reflected in the type of problems those countries may face, and in the 
policies they may adopt to address the challenges of globalization. Thus, to 
assess the likely economic and social impacts of globalization on the Arab 
countries, one has to get acquainted, first, with their main socio-economic 
features.  1 
  The literature offers various definitions of the term ￿globalization￿ 
which perhaps reflect different perceptions of the phenomenon. Thus, we 
must first define the concept of globalization, before attempting to assess 
its implications for the Arab countries.  
    
The study consists of five parts following the Introduction.  Part 
Two will include a review of different definitions and perceptions of 
globalization as derived from the literature.  In Part Three, we shall identify 
the main features of the Arab countries that are relevant to our assessment.  
Part Four will include the assessment of the economic implications of 
globalization with respect to economic growth (and sectoral structure) and 
economic vulnerability.  Part Five will comprise the assessment of the 
social implications of globalization regarding employment and poverty.   
Finally in Part Six, some policies will be suggested to enable the Arab 
countries to deal with globalization more effectively. 
 
 
II. The Concept of Globalization
2 
 
Globalization is at the same time an old and a recent phenomenon.  It is an 
old phenomenon if we confine it to the volume of international trade, since 
for the industrial countries the level of merchandize trade relative to GDP 
prevailing in 1913 was not obtained again until the late 1960￿s or 1970￿s, 
and some countries have not reached the earlier level yet, such as Australia, 
Denmark, Japan and the United Kingdom (Feenstra, 1998).  However, it is 
a recent phenomenon if we broaden it to include trade and financial flows, 
outsourcing of production, etc. based on the outcome of the Uruguay 
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994), 
whose implementation started with the establishment of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 1995.  
 
We are more concerned in this study with the recent vintage of 
globalization, embodied in GATT 1994 and implemented by the WTO 
through the enforcement of its rules and regulations. Since there is no 
universal definition of globalization, the literature will be reviewed to select 
the appropriate and operational concept to be adopted for our analysis. 
 
Globalization is perceived by some authors as an abstract concept that 
does not refer to a concrete object but to an interpretation of a societal 
process (Lubbers, 1998).  Others define  it  as the process by which 
nationality becomes increasingly irrelevant. According to this perception, 
two types of globalization exist: globalization of consumption, referring to  2 
the situation where the nationality of the consumer becomes independent of  
the nation in which a product was made; and globalization of 
production/ownership, indicating that the nationality of the owner and 
controller of productive assets is independent of the nation hosting them 
(Head, 1997). 
 
Michel Camdessus, the former managing director of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), described globalization as an architecture made up 
of seven building blocks that will lead to the prosperity of the world.  
 
The seven blocks are: The tremendous potential for growth and 
prosperity globalization provides countries fully integrating into the global 
economy; integration (by integrating themselves, the poorest countries will 
accelerate development); the universal consensus on the importance of an 
increasingly open and liberal system of capital flows; the golden rule of 
transparency; good governance; a set of standards and codes of best 
practices; and the option for the multilateral approach to handle problems 
that are now more global in nature (Camdessus, 1998). 
 
Another definition in the literature differentiates globalization from 
internationalization. According to this perspective, the world at present is 
undergoing an ￿internationalization￿ phenomenon and not a ￿globalization￿ 
phenomenon. In the international economy, trade and financial flows take 
place between nations and under the regulations and laws of those nations, 
while in the global economy all the international relations (trade, capital 
flows, etc.) take place under unified international laws and regulations 
issued and enforced by international institutions (Hirst and Thompson, 
1996). 
 
Perhaps the most operational definition of globalization for our purpose 
is the one which characterizes globalization in terms of its major 
dimensions. Globalization is a process which involves trade liberalization, 
financial liberalization, outsourcing of production, and the increased 
harmonization of economic institutions and the regulatory framework in the 
countries of the globe (Cardoso, 1996; Sachs, 1998). 
 
  To study the implications of globalization for the Arab countries, 
we should, first, get acquainted with the current state of globalization in 
terms of its four dimensions and the major players (developed vis-à-vis 
developing countries) in each of them. This will clarify the present picture 
of globalization which will enable us to assess its likely economic and 
social impact on the Arab countries.  3 
International Trade 
 
International trade, one of the four major aspects of globalization, has as its  
main actors the Triad countries (North America, European Union (EU) and 
Japan) and the multinational corporations (MNCs)
3.  In 1992, 69.9% of  
world exports took place within the Triad countries
4, which have only 14 
percent of the world￿s population (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, Tables 3.2 
and 3.3). MNCs are also major players in international trade; about 80% of 
US trade was conducted by MNCs, which is typical for the developed 
countries as a whole. Also, 90% of MNC headquarters are located in the 
developed countries (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p.53). 
 
North-South trade has fallen as a proportion of world trade due to 
the decline of the share of raw materials in total trade. This decline is 
attributed to the fall in oil prices after 1985 and to the deterioration of the 
terms of trade of raw materials (Jilberto and Mommen, 1998). The fall in 
North-South trade, and the small share of the intra-trade of the developing 
countries indicate the marginalization of the Third World with respect to 
this dimension of globalization. 
 
 
Financial Liberalization  
 
Financial liberalization is the second aspect of globalization. Liberalization 
involves short-term capital flows and foreign direct investment (FDI). The 
latter is the most important component of financial liberalization because of 
its impact on economic development in the Third World countries. Looking 
at the world distribution pattern of FDI, one finds that it is concentrated in 
the developed countries. The Triad countries￿North America, Europe and 
Japan￿attracted 75% of the FDI  flows over the 1980￿s; and at the 
beginning of the 1990￿s, 75% of the total accumulated FDI stock and 60% 
of the FDI flows were attracted by these three players (Hirst and 
Thompson, 1996). The MNCs are also the main channel for global FDI. 
The 100 largest MNCs accounted for a third of the total FDI stock and 14% 
of the total flow in 1990; 60% of the MNC FDI stock was associated with 
manufacturing, 37% with services, and only 3% with the primary sector 
(Hirst and Thompson, 1996).  
 
The South is left behind in this dimension of globalization as well. 
Only 5% of the stock of FDI had its origins with MNCs in the developing 
countries. Moreover, two thirds of the FDI flowing to the developing  4 
countries are concentrated in ten countries only
5, leaving the majority of the 
developing countries in a disadvantageous situation (Hirst and Thompson, 
1996). What is striking is the large increase in FDI relative to exports since 
the 1980￿s. For example, between 1983 and 1990, FDI flows grew at an 
average annual rate of 34% compared with an annual rate of 9% for world 
merchandise trade; i.e., FDI grew almost four times faster than trade over 
the eight-year period (Hirst and Thompson, 1996). In another estimate, FDI 
flows grew three times faster than trade flows and almost four times faster 
than output (Jilberto and Mommen, 1998). Despite the difference in 
estimates, both sources agree that FDI grew at a much faster rate than did 
trade.  
 
Liberalization of short-term capital flows minimizes risks and 
maximizes profits for the investors in the financial markets. International 
financial markets allow residents of different countries to pool various 
risks, achieving more effective insurance than domestic markets would 
allow (Obstfeld, 1998). On the other hand, liberalization of short-term 
capital has its negative impact on investment and production. Despite the 
positive impact of financial liberalization, the quick and large profits that 
short-term capital may realize in a relatively short period of time by 
moving globally between financial markets reduces the supply of funds 
available for direct investment. It has been observed that the increase in 
profits achieved by the globalization of production does not translate into 
increased investment in production as would have been expected, since a 
good part of these profits find their way to financial markets instead of 
being re-invested in production.  
 
 
Internationalization of Production 
 
Globalization is also characterized by the internationalization of 
production. At present, it is quite common for the production of one good 
to be allocated among several countries to lower costs and maximize 
profits. The MNCs are also leaders in the outsourcing of production. It is 
estimated that one third of the total trade in the US is intra-MNC trade 
(Hirst and Thompson, 1996). The integration of production itself leads to 
more trade as intermediate inputs cross borders several times during the 
manufacturing process (Feenstra, 1998). Outsourcing the production of 
some goods or some intermediate products to developing countries where 
wages are low has  generated a body of literature that investigates the 
impact of this phenomenon on the labour market in the developed 
economies. These countries are currently experiencing rising  5 
unemployment of unskilled labour and a deterioration in income 
distribution due to the growing income gap between the wages of unskilled 
and skilled workers (Kim, 1997).  
 
There is more than one factor responsible for this phenomenon in 
the developed countries, and the studies differ among themselves with 
respect to the relative weights they give to those factors. Some studies 
attribute the main cause of the rising unemployment of unskilled labour and 
the deterioration in income distribution in the developed countries to the 
outsourcing of some products to developing countries (Feenstra, 1998; 
Feenstra and Hanson, 1997). Others argue that the impact of this factor on 
the labour market of the advanced economies is minor, and they maintain 
that the main cause is the rapid technological development which has led to 
less demand for unskilled labour and an intensified use of capital and 
skilled labour (IMF, 1997; Burtless 1995). Outsourcing of  some products 
to developing countries can be viewed as highly beneficial for the 
developed countries if their economies have flexible labour markets and 
effective adjustment mechanisms to shift their production to sectors with 
higher value added per unit of input than low value-added manufacturing 
(IMF, 1997).  
 
Despite the fact that the developed countries produced more than 
two-thirds of  the global GDP from 1970-1989
6, and that the flow of FDI to 
the developing countries, even in periods of peak flow, is a tiny portion of 
the capital stock in the developed world
7, the developed countries perceive 
the outsourcing of unskilled labour-intensive products to the developing 
countries as a threat to their economies. If this threat is real in the sense that 
the advanced economies are confronted with the prospect of the collapse of 
employment and output, then they may go so far as to reintroduce tariff 
barriers and exclude Third World products. In such an eventuality, to quote 
Hirst and Thompson (1996; p.119), ￿GATT would be swept away by 
political necessity￿.  
 
 
The Spread of the Global Market Economy  
 
The fourth dimension of globalization is the spread of the global market 
economy. The state was a major player in the economic system adopted by 
many developing countries in the sixties and seventies. In the eighties and 
nineties, this system was abandoned by many Third World countries and 
substituted by the free-market system which was based on the International  6 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) tailored structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs). In many cases the SAPs were not successful in 
achieving the economic objectives of the developing countries (increasing 
production, raising incomes, reducing unemployment, etc.). The success of 
these programmes was confined mainly to the financial objectives, such as 
reducing government deficits and inflation rates. In many countries, 
including the Arab countries, these IMF-WB SAPs produced negative 
results, such as raising unemployment, increasing poverty, and worsening 
the income distribution pattern. Thus, although the institutionalization of 
the market-economy system worldwide will help to speed up globalization, 
the fruit of this process may not be equally shared by the developed and 
developing countries. The already wide economic and social gaps between 
the parties involved may grow even wider. 
 
 
III.  Main Features of the Arab Countries 
 
The countries in the Arab region are not homogenous in their economic 
structure or their size, and this has significant implications for the policies 
they adopt and the problems they face. Therefore, some classification of 
these countries into homogeneous sub-groups should be made according to 
a chosen criterion. Two types  of classification are adopted by the 
organizations working in the region.  The first is the classification used by 
the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), which 
divides the member countries into two groups: the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) members, which include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE); and the non-GCC 
countries, which include the rest of the Arab countries.  The second 
classification is adopted in the Unified Arab Economic Report, produced by 
the Arab League, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, 
the Arab Monetary Fund, and the Organization of the Arab Oil Exporting 
Countries (Arab League et al, 1994).  This classification divides the Arab 
countries into two groups: the major oil-exporting countries (which include 
the GCC members plus Algeria, Iraq and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) and 
the rest of the Arab countries (which have more diversified economies).  
We shall adopt the latter classification since the major oil-exporting 
countries with their special characteristics￿the relatively high income per 
capita, the heavy dependence on one commodity (oil), less diversified 
economies and the small population in most of them￿might be affected 
differently by the economic and social implications of globalization from 
the other Arab countries. 
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  One may point out the following features and differences among 
the countries of the region: 
 
  The major oil-exporting countries, especially the GCC members, 
are small in terms of population, but relatively large with respect to the 
GNP; the reverse is true in the other Arab countries with more diversified 
economies. Based on the data in Tables 1 and 2, Group 1 countries have 
32.7% of the population and claim 66.2% of the total GNP of the region.  
The GCC countries as a subgroup of Group 1 have 10.9% of the population 
and claim 39.2% of the GNP in the region.  Saudi Arabia has the largest 
GNP in the Arab region (21% of the total).  Group 2 countries have 67.3% 
of the population and 33.8% of the total GNP in the Arab region.  This has 
been reflected in the considerably higher income per capita in Group 1, 
especially in the GCC countries, as compared to the average income per 
capita in Group 2 countries. 
 
  As shown in Table 1, in the major oil-exporting countries 
population is below 3 million in each of the GCC countries in 1998, with 
the exception of Saudi Arabia whose population is close to 20 million.  
Among the non-GCC countries in Group 1, Algeria has the largest 
population  (close to 30 million).  In Group 2 countries, the population is 
less than 10 million in half of them (Lebanon, Tunisia, Jordan, Djibouti and 
Mauritania), while below 20 million in two countries (Syria and Yemen), 
around 30 million in Morocco and Sudan, and about 61 million in Egypt. 
 
  The average annual population growth rate is the highest in the 
GCC countries (2.9%), as compared to an average growth rate of 2.5% in 
Group 2 countries and 2.0% in the non-GCC countries in Group 1 (Table 
1).  This average population growth rate in the Arab region is considerably 
higher than the comparable rate over the period 1990-98 in the world￿s 
low-income countries (2.0%), middle-income countries (1.5%) and high-
income countries (0.7%) (World Bank, 2000a, Table 3).  
 
  One of the consequences of the high population growth rate in the 
Arab region is the low ratio of labour force to total population as compared 
to other groups of countries.  In 1998, the participation rate was about 37% 
in the GCC countries and Group 2 countries, and 31% in the non-GCC 
countries in Group 1 (Table 1).  This is much lower than the comparable 
ratio in the low-, middle- and high-income countries in 1998, which is 
50.0%, 44.0% and 48.6%, respectively (calculated from: World Bank, 
2000a, Table 3).  This low participation rate results in a high dependency 
ratio in the Arab region, which is one of the primary causes of poverty
8.   8 
This ratio is between 3 and 4 in all the Arab countries (with the exception 
of Somalia and the UAE) as compared to a value of 2 in the developed 
countries (e.g., France, Germany and the  USA) and the newly 
industrialized countries (NICs), such as Hong Kong and Singapore 
(Korayem, 1998).  Another consequence of the relatively high population 
growth rate is that a high percentage of the population is below 15 years of 
age, which implies a potential increase in the rate of growth of the supply 
of labour in the coming generations.  This will increase the potential for 
unemployment in the region, especially given that one of the likely impacts 
of globalisation on the Arab countries, (as developing countries), is an 
increase in unemployment (see section V.1 in this paper). The ratio of the 
population below 15 years of age in total population in 1998 in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region, which is representative of the Arab 
region according to the World Bank classification
9, is 42.1% as compared 
to 38.7% in the low-income countries, 36.5% in the middle-income 
countries, and 33.1% in the high-income countries
10. 
 
  As can be seen from Table 2, all the countries in Group 1 (with the 
exception of Algeria) as well as Lebanon in Group 2 have a GNP per capita 
in 1998 that ranges between $3650 and $16,900.  Algeria and more than 
half of the countries in Group 2 (Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Djibouti 
and Syria) have a GNP per capita that ranges between $1000 and $2050.  
The rest of the Arab countries in Group 2 (Mauritania, Sudan and Yemen) 
have GNP per capita less than $400.  This means that three out of the 
nineteen Arab countries have per capita GNP below $1000.  This implies 
an improvement in the average income in the Arab region, specifically in 
Group 2 countries
11, since five out of the nineteen countries had income per 
capita below $1000 in 1993 (Korayem, 1996). 
 
Looking at the structure of production in the Arab countries in 
1998, Table 2 shows that the extractive industries￿which are mainly oil￿ 
represent about one-quarter or more of the GDP in the GCC countries, with 
the exception of the UAE and Bahrain in which the share of the extracting 
industries in GDP is 22.0% and 13.5%, respectively. Excluding Iraq, which 
is presently subject to international sanctions, the relative share of the 
extractive industries in GDP in the non-GCC countries in Group 1 is 16% 
in Libya and 23% in Algeria. The manufacturing sector in most of the 
major oil-exporting countries is involved in producing oil-related 
commodities, such as petrochemicals and oil products, etc. (see the 
manufacturing sector in the GCC countries in: The Inter-Arab Investment 
Guarantee Corporation (1994)). Bahrain, Algeria and Iraq have more  9 
diversified production structures than other countries in Group 1. In all the 
GCC countries excepting Saudi Arabia, the agricultural sector is 
insignificant (3.4% or lower of GDP). In Saudi Arabia and Libya, the 
relative share of agriculture in GDP is around 7%, while its relative share is 
as high as 11% and 33% in Algeria and Iraq, respectively. 
 
The countries in Group 2 have a more diversified structure of 
production (see Table 2). With the exception of Djibouti and Jordan, the 
relative share of  the agricultural sector ranges between 8% in Lebanon and 
49% in Sudan. The relative share of the manufacturing sector in GDP 
ranges between less than 4% in Djibouti and 18% in Tunisia. The relative 
share of the extractive industries is in the range of 11% and 19% in three 
countries (Mauritania, Syria and Yemen), and 6% in Egypt. It falls to 4% 
and less in the rest of the countries in the group. 
 
Reviewing the ratios of government revenue and expenditure in the 
two groups of countries in the Arab region as reported in Table 3, one finds 
the following:  In 1998, the ratio of government revenue to GDP in all the 
major oil-exporting countries (Group 1), with the exception of Libya and 
Kuwait, falls within the range of 24% and 34%. In Group 2, all the 
countries, with the exception of Lebanon and Sudan, have a ratio of 
government expenditure to GDP that ranges between 22% and 32%. This 
shows that, with few exceptions, the ratio of government revenue to GDP 
falls between one-fourth and one-third in the two groups of countries. This 
is quite a convergence between the two groups of countries as compared to 
1993, when the difference between them in this ratio was significant
12. On 
the other hand, there is a considerable difference in the ratio of government 
expenditure to GDP in the two groups of countries. In 1998, government 
expenditure in GDP was around 40% and more in the major-oil exporting 
countries, with the exception of Bahrain and Algeria. In the Group 2 
countries, the ratio was below 30% for all of them, with the exception of 
Lebanon, Jordan and Yemen. 
 
This close range between the two groups of countries in the 
government revenue ratio and the considerable differences in the 
government expenditure ratio is reflected in the difference in the size of 
government budget deficits in the major oil-exporting countries as 
compared to the other Arab countries in Group 2. In Group 1 countries, the 
budget deficit in 1998 was 5% and higher in the GCC countries, while it 
was lower in the non-GCC countries (zero deficit in Libya and 4% in 
Algeria). The budget deficit was below 5% for all Group 2 countries, with 
the exception of Lebanon (16%) and Jordan (7%) (Table 3).  10 
 
Table 4 shows the trade and current account balances in the Arab 
region in 1998. Looking at the balance of trade in Group 1, one finds that 
all the countries, with the exception of Oman, have a trade surplus. The 
ratio of trade surplus to GDP is 3% and below in four countries (Qatar, 
Bahrain, Libya and Algeria), and 7% and higher (up to 9%) in the UAE, 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In Oman, the trade deficit amounts to 2.2% of 
GDP. In Group 2, all the countries have a deficit in the balance of trade, 
with the exception of Mauritania. The ratio of the trade deficit to GDP is 
9% and higher in all the countries in the group with the exception of Syria, 
and reaches 22% and 36% in Jordan and Lebanon, respectively. The current 
account in 1998 was in deficit in both groups of countries, with the 
exception of the UAE and Kuwait in Group 1, and Jordan, Syria and 
Mauritania in Group 2. However, the current account deficit was 
considerably higher in the GCC countries as compared to the other major 
oil-exporting countries and all the countries in Group 2, with the exception 
of Lebanon and Sudan; it is 10% and higher in the GCC countries as 
compared to 5% and lower in the other Arab countries. 
 
 
IV.  Economic Implications of Globalization for the Arab Countries 
 
As already mentioned in Part Two, globalization is a multi-dimensional 
process. It amounts to redefining borders in time and space. For the purpose 
of discussing the economic implications of globalization for the Arab 
countries, it may be useful to focus on its four specific dimensions: trade 
liberalization, financial liberalization, outsourcing of production and 
standardization of  institutions and regulatory frameworks. Due to space 
considerations, we shall confine our discussion of the economic 
implications to two aspects only, namely: growth/sectoral structure of   
GDP, and vulnerability. 
 
 
IV.1. Implications for Growth and Sectoral Structures 
 
Conventional wisdom dictates that overall economic growth combines 
growth in factor inputs and the growth in total factor productivity. The 
implications of globalization for economic growth will depend on the 
prospects of the growth in factor inputs and in total factor productivity 
under globalization. A clear distinction has to be made of various 
categories of  countries: in particular developed versus developing, open- 11 
border  versus land-locked or  isolated
13.  More than two centuries ago, 
Adam Smith observed that the great geographical discoveries at the turn of 
the 15
th century were the ￿greatest and most important events recorded in 
the history of mankind￿ (Sachs, 1998). They paved the way for the first 
￿global￿ division of labour, with Smith providing the theoretical model 
expounding the benefits of trade liberalization.  New mathematical models 
of endogenous growth have lately been developed which emphasize that 
long-run growth depends on increased productivity and innovation, which 
in turn depend on the scope of the market. If outsourcing raises productivity 
and cuts unit costs, a ￿new division of labour￿ emerges within the context 
of the MNCs. Sachs observed that early postwar development economists 
could not conceive of such a division of labour in manufacturing. 
According to him, those economists ￿simply couldn￿t conceive of the 
production process being a complementary relationship between advanced 
and developing countries￿..both sides of the great income divide stand to 
benefit from globalization￿ (Sachs, 1998, p.101)
14. It should be stressed, 
however, that the standard theory rests on some critical assumptions￿ 
most notably competition in factor and product markets (Stiglitz, 1998).   
 
  There is currently a heated debate regarding the relation of 
openness and growth (Edwards, 1998; Greenaway et al., 1977; Frankel and 
Romer, 1999; de Mello, Jr., 1999).  Part of the debate is related to 
conceptual issues￿trade liberalization versus outward orientation.  Part of 
it relates to methodological issues￿particularly the measurement of 
openness and hypothesis-testing based on cross-section regression analysis. 
Another methodological problem is the difficulty in establishing trade-
growth causality due to the endogeneity of both trade and GDP growth. 
 
  We shall not go into the details of this debate.  One may only point 
to the difficulty of answering the question regarding the implications of 
trade liberalization for economic growth. By necessity, the broader issue of 
the implications of globalization for growth will be much more difficult to 
clarify.  The reason is that globalization, as already indicated in Part Two 
above, involves trade liberalization, financial liberalization, outsourcing of 
production, and the standardization of institutions and regulatory 
frameworks around the world.  Against this background, one may ask: 
What does globalization imply for growth of the Arab economies?  
 
A. Implications for growth  Growth depends on changes of both factor 
inputs and total factor productivity. With regard to the latter, we can only 
say that globablization may be expected to raise total factor productivity.   12 
Factor inputs represent mainly labour and capital.  With regard to labour 
input, it may be safe to assume that the change in labour input will depend 
on the behaviour of the demand for labour under globalization.  The 
demand for labour and employment is discussed in detail in section V.1 
below.  With regard to the supply of labour (availability of labour input), 
this should not be a constraining factor to economic growth in the light of 
existing high rates of unemployment in most of the Arab countries and the 
high rate of labour force growth.  Thus, although accurate and regular data 
on unemployment are rather scarce in the Arab countries, available 
evidence shows high rates of unemployment in the region (see section V.1 
below).  
 
  The total labour force amounted to 92.6 million out of a population 
of about 270 million, making an overall participation rate for the Arab 
countries of 36% (Table 1).  The average annual growth rate of the labour 
force from 1990-1998 is estimated at 3.4% in the MENA region (World 
Bank, 2000a, Table 3).  For the purpose of judging the prospects of labour 
supply in the Arab countries, therefore, it is interesting to note that they 
have the lowest labour force participation rate and the highest labour force 




  We conclude this part on labour input by saying that as far as long-
run growth is concerned, Arab economies need not worry about the 
availability of labour. In fact, they may have to consider structural changes 
to enhance the labour intensity of economic activity.  They also have to 
improve the quality of their labour force through education and training. 
That way, they can ensure that growth will be labour-absorbing.  
 
  What about the other factor input in the growth process ￿ capital?  
Available data suggest that the 1970￿s were perhaps the golden decade in 
terms of the rate of capital accumulation in the Arab countries. Thus, while 
fixed investment during the 1970￿s grew annually at rates averaging from 
10% to 15%, its growth was mostly negative during the 1980￿s. Consider 
the illustrative cases of a number of Arab countries (Table 5).  The data 
show that the decade of the 1970￿s witnessed a boom in investment.  In 
every country in the region, investment accelerated.  One may explain this 
by the oil booms of 1973-74 and 1979-80
16. The dollar value of oil exports 
from the Arab countries rose by 2385% in nominal terms, and by 794% in 
real terms during the 1970￿s
17.  On the other hand, the 1980￿s witnessed an 
absolute decline in many of the Arab countries.  Again this was strongly  13 
correlated with rather dismal oil fortunes during the decade.  Since 1980, 
the real price of oil was subject to steady decline with fluctuations in the 
range of $15 ￿ $20 per barrel in 1995 prices.  In fact it never regained its 
1974 level throughout the period following 1984.  This may explain the 
very significant drop in the economic growth rate of the Arab countries 
from 1980 to 1991 corresponding to the fall in investment reported in Table 
5. 
 
  In terms of macro balances, the fall in investment implies a 
particular pattern of adjustment to the fluctuations in the price of oil and oil 
revenue.  Analysis of saving behaviour for the oil-exporting countries 
during the 1980￿s and 1990￿s may throw some light on this adjustment 
pattern.  Thus, during the boom, savings increase at a rate lower than the 
rate of increase in real income; but during the bust, savings fall by the full 
extent of the decline in real income.  For example, during the oil boom of 
1996-97, real income resulting from terms-of-trade improvement increased 
by 4.6% of GDP for all oil exporters taken together.  But savings increased 
by only 2.5% of GDP.  During the oil bust of 1998, while oil exporters as a 
group sustained a terms-of-trade related drop in their real income of 5.4% 
of GDP, their savings fell by 5.3% of GDP (World Bank, 2000b, Table 
4.1).  At the same time the rate of investment was almost constant at about 
22% in 1998 and 1993
18.  This means, correspondingly, that consumption 
rises faster than income throughout the oil-price cycle; the adjustment to 
the fall in income is made through the reduction in savings.  If the trend in 
the long run is a decline in the real price of oil, this pattern, if it persists, 
has disturbing implications for investment, growth and employment. 
 
  So far, our analysis of macro adjustment to boom and bust in world 
markets has focussed on Arab oil-exporting countries. But what about the 
non-oil exporting ones? In an attempt to address this question, we make the 
following observations.  First, oil is important as a source of foreign-
exchange revenues to non-GCC countries in Group 1 (such as Libya, Iraq, 
and Algeria), and to some of the more diversified economies in Group 2 
(such as Egypt, Syria and Yemen).  There are indications that Sudan may 
soon join this club.  According to 1998 data, oil exports accounted for 
about 40%, 44% and 46% of the value of total exports of Egypt, Yemen 
and Syria respectively (Table 4).  Second, labour movement within the 
region and related remittance income has forged a very strong link between 
oil and non-oil economies in the region.  This has tempted some analysts to 
talk about remittance sensitive states (RSS).  Sullivan (1998) observed that 
not only oil shocks (such as in 1985-86) but also other non-oil shocks to the 
oil states, such as the Gulf crisis of 1990-91, can affect RSSs rather  14 
significantly (Sullivan, 1998)
19. Third, capital flows from the oil states to 
non-oil states in the region represent yet another link, which proved rather 
sensitive to oil-related developments.  Fourth, in the case of certain 
strategically located countries such as Egypt, transport activities related to 
the oil trade contribute significantly to the economy.  We conclude, 
therefore, that macro-economic adjustments to oil booms and busts apply to 
oil and non-oil economies in the Arab world. 
 
  How then does globalization affect the growth of the Arab 
countries? The answer is neither easy nor straight forward; remember that 
globalization can be a vague￿if not fuzzy￿term. However, it may be 
useful for organizing one￿s thinking to make a distinction between two 
types of considerations which may have bearing on the question raised. 
There are general considerations and specific considerations. The first 
category represents factors that may apply to all developing countries in 
general. The second category represents factors that apply to the Arab 
countries specifically.  Let us address the first category first:   
 
1.Globalization may be viewed as a new stage in the development of the 
capitalist system. At this stage the world economy suffers a multi-
dimensional crisis: a crisis of structural over-accumulation and financial 
anarchy. In the industrialized countries, which are the locomotive of the 
world economy, the rate of gross fixed  capital formation (i.e., fixed 
investment as a proportion of GDP) has been falling since the mid-
seventies. For example, the rate of investment has fallen from 30% to 19% 
in Germany and from 20% to 14% in the United States between the mid-
fifties and the mid-nineties (Kisker, 1996). For the group of countries 
which now constitute the European Union, the investment rate fell from 
about 25% to about 19% and for Japan from 36% to 28% over the period 
1965 to 1994 (Hirst and Thompson, 1998, p.126). The other side of the coin 
is secular decline in the world economy (Table 6). 
 
  The overall picture is quite clear. There is a downward trend in real 
world GDP growth since the mid-sixties. The growth rate achieved in 1998 
was almost one-third of the average for the period 1966 to 1973. The 
regional variations in GDP growth rates do not change the overall picture, 
but rather confirm it. With regard to growth prospects in developing 
countries, it is more likely that their growth from 1999 to 2008 will be 
lower than the growth rates achieved before the financial crises of 1997 to 
1999 (World Bank, 2000, p.3). Several factors contribute to this outcome: 
most notably, a significantly less favorable and more fragile external  15 
environment and a prolonged working-out of structural weakness in the 
developing countries￿ financial sectors and fiscal balances
20. 
 
  The financial crises of 1997-99 revealed the fragility of the 
international financial system, or rather the lack of an adequate system. Due 
to the tremendous development in the financial industry, particularly the 
creation of derivatives and the expansion of forward exchange-rate 
transactions, it is becoming possible for some agents to create money or 
liquidity in offshore markets without control by any national authority. This 
has created imbalance between the real side and the financial side of the 
world economy. It is estimated that the value of annual foreign-exchange 
transactions is almost one hundred times the value of international trade
21. 
Financial liberalization in many countries taking place within the context of 
structural adjustment programmes through the Bretton Woods institutions, 
facilitated the movement of hot money between various markets. Against 
this background, one observes the recurrence of financial and foreign 
exchange crises at an accelerating pace: 1987, 1992, 1995, 1997-99. 
 
  Among the general considerations in the context of the growth 
implications of globalization, special mention should be made of 
GATT/WTO discipline. Most important, by emphasizing liberalization as 
the dominant issue, it has created a regime which may be appropriate for 
trade but perhaps not as appropriate for governing the flows of FDI. The 
current ungoverned and skewed distribution of FDI threatens to limit the 
growth of the entire world economy and tilt the terms of trade against 
developing countries (Hirst and Thompson, 1998, p.52). 
 
2. With regard to the specific considerations relevant to the case of the 
Arab countries for discussing the growth implications of globalization,  we 
must emphasize oil and foreign investments. The Arab countries together 
have more than 60% of the world￿s proven oil reserves, and at least one-
fifth of the natural gas reserves
22. Oil has played a crucial role in the recent 
economic history of the region. We have discussed the macro adjustment 
problem posed by booms and busts related to oil. Although it may be 
difficult to rigorously link oil prospects to globalization, one may relate the 
prospects of oil to world growth in the context of globalization. We have 
already noted the apparent likely trend toward decline in world growth and 
its relation to globalization. That should mean slower growth in demand for 
oil, other things being equal. If we also assume that technological advance 
as part of globalization may reduce energy intensity of output in general, 
and oil intensity in particular, we reach the conclusion that  the observed  16 
trend in the real price of oil since 1980 will most probably continue (see 
data in Arab League et al., 1999, p.260 and p.262). 
 
  The price of oil experienced a very hard landing in 1998, falling to 
a twenty-year historical low (World Bank, 2000b, Table A2.11).  With 
regard to long-term prospects, the World Bank forecasts oil prices to 
remain under downward pressure in the longer run.  The main factors 
behind this development are limited growth in demand for OPECs crude 
oil, increased competition from both oil and other energy producers, falling 
production costs for crude oil and other energy sources in the light of 
technological advances (in oil shale and liquefied natural gas). These 
factors may effectively set a price ceiling for crude oil in the neighborhood 
of $20 per barrel for the foreseeable future (World Bank, 2000, p.25).  This 
is almost the same nominal price which prevailed during the oil booms of 
the early- and mid-nineties, but significantly below the price experienced 
during the oil boom of 1979-85 (see World Bank, 2000, Table A2.11; the 
Arab League et al., 1999; Annex Table 5/4). It is important to note that 




  It should be observed that, according to some energy experts, oil 
and natural gas fall under the GATT/WTO discipline, although they were 
not explicitly mentioned in GATT 1947. GATT 1994, including the 
agreement on trade in goods, Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) 
and Trade Related Intellectual Property (TRIPS), has a clear bearing on oil 
and gas by the force of its three basic principles, particularly the tariff-only 
principle (Abdalla, 1999). If putting a ceiling on oil production (in order to 
protect its real price and to conserve) is successfully challenged within 
WTO, this would mean that the long-run oil price forecasts mentioned 
above would have to be revised downward. 
 
Foreign investment   MNCs are playing an increasingly important role in 
the context of globalization. GATT 1994 included a separate agreement on 
foreign investment, the agreement on TRIMS. The essence of this 
agreement is deregulation. This means that member countries commit 
themselves to remove various regulations put in place previously to ensure 
that foreign investment brings maximum benefit (contribution) to the 
economic development of the host country. Thus, national investment 
codes will eventually have to be revised to drop such stipulations as 
domestic content requirements, balance-of-payments requirements, and 
employment-of-nationals requirements. This is a good example of the  17 
fourth dimension of globalization mentioned in Part Two above 
(harmonization of regulatory framework). 
 
  The Arab countries as a group send much larger investments 
abroad than what they receive. There are no accurate data on the outflow of 
Arab investment. But an estimate may be made for the first half of the 
1990￿s. The stock of Arab investments abroad rose from $400 billion in 
1990 to $750 billion in 1995 (Kharioush and El-Hamoury, 2000) One may 
infer from this information that the net outflow of Arab investments 
averaged about $50 billion annually during 1990-95. About 80% of Arab 
investments are based in the developed economies in Europe, Japan and the 
United States, the bulk of which is bank deposits and government 
securities. The flow of Arab investment to Arab countries is just a trickle, 
representing $1.5 ￿ $2.0 billion annually (Kharioush and El-Hamoury, 
2000). 
 
  The Arab countries have attracted only limited amounts of FDI, 
fluctuating around 0.5% of GDP during the decade from 1985 to 1994. The 
bulk of  this investment was concentrated in the energy sector. In the first 
half of the nineties, a number of Arab countries opened up to foreign 
capital by liberalizing the capital account in the balance of payments (Egypt 
is the most important example). Egypt successfully experienced the first 
global deposit receipts (GDR) placement of private sector equities in 
industrial markets. Lebanon has also successfully placed GDRs and 
sovereign bonds to attract foreign-investment participation in its massive 
reconstruction effort. Tunisia has already placed international bond issues 
in the Euro and Samurai markets.  At the same time there has also been a 
dramatic increase in the number of equity mutual funds directed at the 
region (El-Erian and Sheybani, 1997). 
 
  As a result of these and other changes in the international financial 
setting, the flow of net private capital to the group of Arab countries 
included in Table 7 reached $4.3 billion of which $2.4 billion FDI, $2.1 
billion portfolio investment and $ -0.24 billion of net debt flows. The data 
in Table 7 reveal two interesting results. First, the MENA region, which 
consists mainly of Arab countries
24,  compares rather unfavourably both 
with developing countries as a group and with each regional group in the 
developing world, with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa. As a group, 
these Arab countries for which data are available attracted private capital 
only to 1.6% of their GDP in 1997. This is less than one-third the 
corresponding ratio for the developing countries. 
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  The data in Table 7 also show that private foreign-investment flows 
to the majority of Arab countries amounted to less than 1.5% of total 
private flows to developing countries. So the magnitude of private 
investment flows to the Arab countries is extremely low. An interesting 
question is why this rather modest rate of capital inflow to the Arab 
countries, and what are the prospects for future investment in the context of 
globalization?  
 
  Second, the data reveal a highly skewed pattern of inflow. Inflows 
in the form of portfolio investment for the Arab countries included in Table 
7 in 1997 was 48.6% of total private flows and 85.6% of FDI. This 
compares with only 10% and 18.5% respectively for developing countries. 
In the case of Egypt, portfolio investment represented 70% of total private 
capital flows, and more than double the magnitude of FDI. The example of  
Egypt epitomizes the dangers involved in the indiscriminate opening of the 
economy to foreign capital inflows. If foreign capital is necessary to 
complement domestic saving and increase the rate of domestic investment, 
efforts should be directed to attract FDI.  Portfolio investment by its very 
nature is highly volatile and may constrain the conduct of monetary and 
exchange-rate policy
25.  It may even have troubling fiscal consequences. In 
short, portfolio investment should be seen as engendering economic 
vulnerability of a modern vintage. 
 
  The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that in terms of the 
growth of the Arab economies, the globalized  economic environment may 
be  less enabling. We now turn to the issue of the implications for sectoral 
structure.  
 
B. Implications for sectoral structural change  The economies of the Arab 
countries may be characterized as resource-based to varying degrees (see 
Table 2). At one end we find the GCC countries in Group 1, where the 
share of extractive industries in GDP averaged 27% in 1998.  This is 
followed by the more diversified oil countries in Group 1, Libya, Iraq and 
Algeria, where extractive industries contributed about 12% of GDP.  This 
figure would have been higher were it not for the economic sanctions 
imposed on Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait in 1990.  At the other 
end, we have Group 2 countries where the share of extractive industries is 
the lowest, averaging 5% of GDP.  However, if we add the contribution of 
agriculture, the share of resource-based sectors is also high even in this 
group of non-oil economies (about 23% of GDP)
26.  Manufacturing 
accounts for some 10%-15% of GDP, lower in many oil countries, but  19 
about 17-18% in some of the non-oil countries, specifically Egypt, 
Morocco and Tunisia. 
 
  Table 2 also reveals the pattern of sectoral distribution of GDP in 
terms of the familiar commodity-service sector dichotomy. On this basis we 
find that in 1998, there was an even (50-50%) split of GDP between 
commodity and service sectors for Group 1 countries together and about a 
46%-54% split in Group 2 countries. It is interesting to observe that Group 
1 includes high- and upper-middle income countries (except for Iraq and 
Algeria) according to World Bank classification by per capita GDP. Group 
2 is composed of lower-middle and low-income countries (see Table 2). 
One would have expected the share of the tertiary sector to be higher in 
Group 1 than in Group 2 ￿this is from an Engel￿s Law perspective
27. But 
the situation depicted in Table 2 does not obey the economic logic of 
Engel￿s Law. The reason is that in Group 2 countries, the service sector is a 
bundle of formal and largely informal activities reflecting the fact that the 
service sector in a poor developing economy performs the function of a 
reserve and buffer.  
 
  What are the implications of globalization for sectoral structure of 
GDP? In answer to this question we offer the following observations 
regarding dimensions of globalization. 
 
1. Trade liberalization is likely to put the manufacturing sector in the Arab 
countries under relatively stronger competitive pressure due to the more 
open trading regime. Trade liberalization under GATT/WTO discipline 
does not totally preclude government intervention to promote industry. 
Although such discipline prohibits subsidies to exports, most preferential 
measures to protect infant industries and to diversify manufacturing are still 
permissible (Amsden, 2000). GATT 1994, like GATT 1947, allows 
members to protect themselves against competition from aggregate imports 
that destabilize their balance of payments (Article XVIII), and also against 
competition which threatens individual industries. 
 
  With regard to support for industrial development, GATT 1994 
makes a distinction among three categories of subsidies: prohibited, 
actionable and permissible. The latter include those for the promotion of 
research and development (RandD), for regional development, and for 
environmentalism (Amsden, 2000). 
 
  The most important industries in the Arab countries are chemicals 
(including oil refining), food processing, textiles and clothing, and  20 
machinery and transport equipment. According to the most recent figures 
(for 1997), these industries accounted for 23%, 22%, 15% and 13% of 
value added in manufacturing for the Arab countries as a group. There are 
significant country variations. For example, the chemical industry appears 
to be of growing importance in Saudi Arabia
28.  Food processing 
contributes a much higher share in the manufacturing value added in 
Mauritania (41%), Morocco (31%), Lebanon, Iraq and Syria (about 25-
27%). Textiles and clothing play a more important role in Tunisia (36%), 
Syria (31%) and Egypt (23%) (Arab League et al., 1999; Appendix Table 
4/5). 
 
  In addition to the trade liberalization in the globalized context of 
GATT, the manufacturing sector in the Arab countries will be also affected 
by two important developments toward regionalism. The first is the 
partnership agreements between some Arab countries (those in the southern 
Mediterranean) and the European Union (EU) within the framework of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs). So far, four 
association agreements have been signed between the EU and each of 
Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. Egypt appears to 
be in the final stages of reaching an agreement, while Algeria, Lebanon and 
Syria are currently negotiating to conclude association agreements. The 
second is the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), initiated on 17 
February 1997 by the executive programme of the Economic and Social 
Council of the Arab League to set up a free trade area over ten years (1998-
2007). To date, 14 countries have participated in this effort: Jordan, UAE, 
Bahrain, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Egypt and Morocco
29 (Arab League et al., 1999; Ch.12). 
 
  Such a plethora of regional multilateral and bilateral trade 
agreements raises serious issues of trade diversion and trade creation. But 
for our purposes, we would like to underscore the point that a pan-Arab 
integration effort is important for securing better terms for the Arab 
countries in the global economy. One should not push the point about trade 
diversion vs trade creation too far, since it is based on static welfare 
comparisons. The dynamic growth effects, though difficult to measure, may 
be more important. 
 
  On this basis, we argue that expansion of the manufacturing sector 
in the Arab countries within the context of globalization will depend to a 
great extent on the ability of the Arab countries, through integration and 
other measures, to take advantage of some aspects of the present GATT /  21 
WTO discipline to promote manufacturing. Moreover, pan-Arab integration 
will also, among other things, enhance the position of  the Arab countries in 
the competition for FDI on more reasonable terms. The critical mass 
guaranteed by establishing a regional Arab block is a precondition for 
maximizing the gains and minimizing the losses related to globalization. 
 
2.  The other sector which is bound to be directly affected by the trade 
liberalization dimension of globalization is agriculture. One of the 
consequences of the Agreement on Agriculture in GATT 1994 is the 
increase in the world prices of many agricultural commodities￿notably 
wheat, sugar, edible oil and dairy products. Net-food-importing countries 
stand to lose in the process, and their vulnerability may increase if the 
liberalization of agricultural prices generates greater instability. However, 
the higher prices for the main agricultural commodities should provide 
better incentives for local producers, if the right policies are followed. 
Further, increased market access under GATT 1994 in the area of 
agricultural trade may encourage expansion of agricultural production in 
the region, considering its proximity to the European market. Also, if 
globalization frustrated the efforts of the Arab countries to develop 
manufacturing, then the weight of the agricultural sector may increase by 
necessity. 
 
3. The prospects of the service sector in the Arab countries under 
globalization will depend on the overall growth rate of their economies in 
relation to population growth. If economic growth outpaces population 
growth, then we may expect the share of the service sector in GDP to fall 
initially in relative terms, given the biased structure of this sector towards 
informal activities as mentioned above. The composition of service 
activities will change significantly in the process. 
 
IV.2. Economic Vulnerability 
 
What does globalization imply for the Arab countries in terms of economic 
vulnerability?  By economic vulnerability, we mean the degree of 
sensitivity of the country￿s economic conditions (i.e., exports, GDP level 
and growth, inflation, unemployment, poverty and inequality, etc.) in the 
face of external shocks, whether these shocks are positive or negative. In 
this context, we may ponder the risks inherent in the integration of capital 
markets, volatility of international commodity prices (especially oil and 
food), in addition to changes in world interest rates and exchange rates. 
  22 
We first examine the current degree of vulnerability. Two measures 
of vulnerability are used￿one narrow, the other broad. The narrow 
(Measure 1), is the ratio of merchandise trade (exports and imports) to 
GDP. The broad (Measure 2), is expressed in three different variants 
because of data limitations
30: merchandize trade plus remittances (for 
1993)
31; the ratio of merchandize trade plus net income (for 1998, 
alternative a); and the ratio of merchandize trade plus net current transfers 
(for 1998, alternative b). Thus, the results for 1993 and 1998 are 
comparable for Measure 1, but not for Measure 2. The two measures are 
reported in Table 8. 
 
  According to Measure 1 of vulnerability, a general pattern prevails 
in 1993 and 1998. GCC countries generally tend to exhibit a larger degree 
of vulnerability compared to countries of Group 2 and the non-GCC 
countries of Group 1. For all GCC countries, the ratio of merchandise trade 
to GDP was significantly higher than 50%, shooting up to more than 100% 
in a number of cases. In the non-GCC countries of Group 1 and Group 2 
(excepting Mauritania, Jordan and Tunisia), the ratio of merchandise trade 
to GDP is below 50%. This points to a basic difference in the economic 
structure of the GCC countries on one side and the rest of the Arab 
countries on the other. The dependence of GCC countries on oil appears to 
be a major source of vulnerability; such countries are expected to face 
greater challenges in adjusting to external shocks related to oil. 
 
  The incorporation of workers￿ remittances in the measure of 
vulnerability leads to a significant increase in the value of the indicator (see 
Measure 2 for 1993 in Table 8). The increase in the value of the 
vulnerability indicator as a result of including workers￿ remittances applies 
to all countries; but the examples of  Jordan and Egypt are outstanding. For 
Jordan in 1993, Measure 2 produces a value of 131 percent compared to 
107 percent for Measure 1. For Egypt, the corresponding values are 43 
percent and 29 percent respectively. Although intra-regional labour 
movement has forged strong links among the labour-receiving and the 
labour-sending countries, they continue to be a source of vulnerability for 
the latter in particular. Reduced demand for labour in the Gulf impacts 
strongly on the labour markets and the balance of payments of these 
countries, making the adjustment to such shocks rather more difficult. 
 
  According to Measure 2 of vulnerability, a similar pattern prevails 
in 1998. In addition to exports and imports we include both net 
compensation of non-resident workers and investment income (Measure 2,  23 
alternative a in Table 8); we obtain values for the indicator significantly 
above 50% in the GCC countries where data are available, as well as in 
more than half the countries of Group 2. Taking into account net current 
transfers rather than net income (Measure 2, alternative b in Table 8) does 
not change the situation. 
 
  We conclude that, because of the relatively strong vulnerability of 
most of the Arab economies to external shocks, macroeconomic policies 
have to include an anti-cyclical component. It would be more prudent to 
deal with oil-related booms (or booms in commodity prices in general), not 
as permanent shocks, but as temporary ones. The brunt of the adjustment 
would have to be through changes in consumption rather than changes in 
saving and investment. 
 
  In a globalized environment, external shocks may be expected to 
increase. With such high levels of vulnerability as those of the Arab 
economies, macroeconomic management plays a more critical role in 
stabilizing those economies in the face of external shocks. When we look at 
the implications of globalization in terms of vulnerability, we have to 
extend the measures to consider recent changes in exchange rates and 
financial aspects (financial liberalization or capital mobility). 
  
Consider Table 9 which summarizes major changes in the foreign-
exchange regimes of the Arab countries in the second half of the nineties. 
Quite significant changes took place. The number of countries adopting 
floating exchange-rate regimes increased from 6 to 8 countries. 
Correspondingly, the number of those adopting a fixed exchange-rate 
regime fell from 14 to 12 between 1995 and 1998. Nevertheless, 12 
countries still have pegged exchange rates, with some change in the anchor 
away from the American dollar and towards special drawing rights (SDRs). 
Furthermore, by 1998, all countries but one had moved towards a unified 
exchange rate. 
 
  The liberalization of the foreign exchange regime was 
accompanied by liberalization of the capital account in a number of Arab 
countries, alongside restrictive monetary and fiscal policy for stabilization 
in an attempt to attract foreign capital (Arab League et al., 1999, Ch. 7). 
The ultimate result may be portfolio inflows driven by interest arbitrage, 
which may lead to a real appreciation of the national currency and a 
consequent loss of competitiveness. The experience of Egypt under the 
Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme, ERSAP, is a 
vivid example (Abdel-Khalek, 1998). It may not have been a coincidence,  24 
therefore, that the ratio of portfolio investment to total net private capital 
flows to the Arab countries in 1997 was about five times that for 
developing countries as a group; it was 48.6% in the Arab countries as 
compared to 10.1% in the developing countries (calculated from Table 7).    
 
  The simultaneous liberalization of the capital and current accounts 
often produces an uncomfortably high domestic interest/strong currency 
combination. Such a combination of macro prices does not provide a solid 
base for improved trade performance or investment to support economic 
growth. In the process, continuing trade deficits resulting from this 
interest/exchange combination can ultimately lead to a dynamically 
unstable situation: actors may suddenly realize that the risks associated 
with domestic assets are too high. This may very well spark massive capital 
outflow, devaluation and stagflation. Glaring examples of this scenario 
were provided by Mexico in 1994 and East Asian NICs in 1997 (Ocampo 
and Taylor, 1998). 
 
  The trend in the Arab countries during the nineties has been to 
liberalize the current and capital accounts of their balance of payments. For 
example, in Egypt, there are virtually no restrictions on the flow of capital 
in either direction (El-Ektessadia, 1996). In Kuwait, GCC nationals can 
purchase stocks up to a certain limit, non-Kuwaitis can purchase local 
treasury bills and bonds through local banks and investment companies, 
and both Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis can freely buy or sell foreign 
exchange (Lain and Dashti, 1999). Issues of Euro bonds and GDRs have 
been on the rise during the 1990￿s. In 1998, there were new issues of Euro 
bonds and  GDRs placed by companies and banks in Tunisia and Lebanon; 
thus joining Jordan, Bahrain, Egypt and Morocco which had already placed 
a total of about $4 billion in foreign money and financial markets. This may 
be rather modest, but it points to a new and fundamentally important 
development.  
    
  It should be observed that the question of portfolio investment 
flows to the Arab countries has been the subject of heated debate. Some 
argue that FDI may be welcome but not portfolio investment in view of its 
volatile nature. Others tend to stress the benefits of foreigners￿ participation 
in Arab financial markets
32. We are more inclined to doubt the net benefit 
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V.  Social Implications of Globalization for the Arab Countries 
 
Globalization with its four dimensions￿trade liberalization, financial 
liberalization, outsourcing of production, and the widespread 
institutionalization of the market-economy system￿has social implications 
for the Arab countries. We shall focus here on the likely impact of 
globalization on employment and poverty.  
 
V.1. Implications for Employment 
 
Globalization affects employment through its likely impacts on investment, 
economic growth and the demand for labour.  
 
A. The direct impact of the liberalization of financial flows on employment 
in the Arab countries is through the amount of  foreign direct investment 
(FDI) flowing to them. FDI has both direct and indirect effects on 
employment creation in the recipient countries (Lall, 1995). 
 
The direct employment effect of FDI depends on several factors.   
Among those factors are: (i) the size and type of investment: ￿greenfield￿ 
or acquisition. A ￿greenfield￿  investment creates a new productive unit, 
which adds to the productive capacity of the economy and creates new 
employment; while the acquisition of an existing enterprise may not 
necessarily result in an addition to production and employment. (ii) The 
type of technology adopted. Although it is widely accepted that the 
transnational corporations (TNCs) usually adopt the latest technology, the 
investment effect on employment depends on the ability of the host country 
to master the imported technology and adapt it to its needs. (iii) Other 
factors also have direct effects on employment, like the strategy of the 
foreign investor regarding the level and speed of technology upgrading, the 
export-orientation of the project, the corporate integration strategy of the 




FDI also has indirect effects on employment. Among them are 
employment creation in firms which are vertically linked to the TNCs, and 
there may also be spillover effects of TNCs on local science and 
technology, education and training. Lall (1995) concluded that the 
employment effects of  FDI are complex, and that policies can play a 
crucial role in stimulating and guiding them. 
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The likely impact of globalization on employment creation in Arab 
countries will be positive if a good part of the world FDI is flowing to this 
region thus raising the investment rates in the economies. The Arab 
countries already suffer from high unemployment rates. According to the 
latest data available, the unemployment rate in the early nineties was 14% 
in Egypt, 18.8% in Jordan, 15%-17% in Lebanon, 12.3% in Yemen and 
14.8% in the GCC  countries (UNESCWA, 1997a, Table II.3). According 
to other estimates, the unemployment rate reached 20% in Algeria, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Tunisia, 15% in Egypt and Morocco, and 60% in the Gaza 
Strip (UNESCWA, 1997b, p.73). Lately other countries with no 
unemployment (notably GCC countries) have also started to experience this 
problem. Furthermore, unemployment has been wide spreading among 
graduates of university and higher institutes over the past decade (Arab 
League et al., 1999, p.23). 
 
  Investment in the Arab countries amounted to 22.1% of GDP on 
average in 1998 (Table 2). At the country level, the range varies 
considerably. In the nine major oil-exporting countries (Group 1), the 
investment rate is above 20% of GDP in four GCC countries (United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Oman) and Algeria, and in the 
range of 17% to 19% of GDP in the other countries in the group with the 
exception of Kuwait (Table 2). In Group 2, the investment rate is above 
20% in seven countries (Lebanon, Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Syria 
and Yemen), and ranges from 15% to 19% in the three other countries. This 
implies that the major oil-exporting countries in the Arab region compare 
less favorably to other Arab countries with respect to the investment rates 
in 1998, since less than 50% of the countries in Group 1 have investment 
rates higher than 20% as compared to 70% of the countries in Group 2. 
This may be explained by the pattern of adjustment to the fall in oil prices 
and revenue (see section IV.1 above). 
 
  The direct impact of the of liberalization financial flows on 
employment in the Arab region is through the amount of FDI flowing 
to it. As mentioned in Part II above, most of the world FDI is 
allocated to the advanced economies, North America, Europe and 
Japan. A tiny fraction of the already small share of the world FDI  
flowing  to the developing countries is received by the Arab 
countries. Out of a total amount of $163,423 million (net FDI flows 
to all the developing countries in 1997), $5368  million was received 
by the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries (Table 7). 
This means that only 3.3% of the FDI flowing to the Third World countries  27 
is received by the MENA region. Since MENA consists mainly of Arab 
countries as shown above, and since flows to the eight largest Arab 
recipients of FDI as reported in Table 7 totaled $ 2446 million in 1997 (i.e. 
1.5% of total flows), the share of Arab countries seems in fact much less 
than the 3% of flows to developing countries. As a matter of fact, 
UNCTAD estimates imply total net FDI flows to all Arab countries of 
about $2874 million in 1997 (UNCTAD, 1998, Annex Table 1); i.e., about 
1.8% of total flows to developing countries. Consequently, the likely 
impact of financial liberalization on employment in the Arab region is 
negligible, judging by the global distribution of FDI so far. 
 
  Looking at the country level, the three largest recipients of the FDI 
in the Arab region in 1997 were Morocco ($1200 million), Egypt ($891 
million) and Tunisia ($316 million) (Table 7); i.e., the three countries 
together received 44.8% of the FDI flows to the MENA region in 1997
34. 
Comparing the ratio of FDI to total investments in the three countries to 
find out its relative importance to output and employment creation in the 
economy, one finds that in 1997 it represented 17.4% of total investment in 
Morocco, 5.8% in Egypt and 6.2% in Tunisia
35; i.e., in terms of the relative 
importance of FDI in total investment in the three major recipient countries 
in the Arab region, Morocco comes first, followed at a distance by Tunisia 
and Egypt. Yemen, which is one of the low-income countries in the region 
(see Table 2), had a net outflow of FDI of $138 million in 1997 (Table 7), 
amounting  to 8.6% of its total investment
36. 
 
  It might be argued that the potential of the Arab countries to attract 
FDI in the future is greater than at present, when more economic and 
financial liberalization takes place in the region, and all the Arab countries 
become members in the WTO. At present only nine of the Arab countries 
are members of GATT/WTO: Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Djibouti, 
Mauritania, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE and Qatar. Lebanon and Yemen are 
defacto members, and three countries are negotiating for membership: 
Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Sudan (Zarrouk and Zallio, 2000). Even if the 
Arab countries succeed in achieving high rates of economic performance 
and liberalization, it is unlikely that the pattern of global distribution of FDI 
will be changed considerably in their favour in the short and medium term. 
In the eighties and early nineties, the FDI flows were strongly biased 
towards the developed countries as explained in Part II above, despite the 
high economic performance of some developing countries, such as the 
NICs. 
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B.  The  average annual growth of real GDP in the MENA countries over 
the period 1991-98 was lower than that of the other groups of countries in 
the Third World, with the exception of the group designated as Europe and 
Central Asia
37; it is 2.9% as compared to 7.6 % in Asia, 3.6% in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and 4.1% in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 
2000b, Table A2.1). Taking the population growth rate into consideration, 
the real per capita growth rate in the MENA region falls to 0.6% during the 
period 1991-98, as compared to 6.0% in Asia, 1.6% in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, and 0.1% in Sub-Saharan Africa. The GDP growth rate of 
the higher income economies was 2.3% over the same period, and their real 
per capita GDP growth rate was 1.6% (World Bank, 2000b, Table A2.2). 
Will globalization increase this modest rate of growth in the Arab region? 
        
There are two views￿optimistic and pessimistic￿regarding the 
impact of globalization on economic growth in the developing countries in 
general, and its consequent impact on employment in particular. Within the 
optimistic view there are two variants. One variant predicts rapid growth in 
a substantial part of the Third World, in East and South Asia and, possibly, 
in Latin America (Hirst and Thompson, 1996). The other variant holds that 
all countries will share the benefits of globalization according to the 
standard theory. This implies an increase in the economic growth of Third 
World countries through innovations and access to large markets, with the 
consequent positive impacts on employment. Three exceptions are 
mentioned in this respect: land-locked countries, tropical-climate countries, 
and major producers of natural resources, such as oil (Sachs, 1998).  
 
The pessimistic view predicts that capital mobility and free trade will 
shift manufacturing investments from the industrial countries to the low-
wage developing countries without benefiting the workers in the 
developing countries.  This is because authoritarian governments and 
repressive labour laws will hold wages down in the Third World. Some 
even argue that economic growth in developing countries which is driven 
primarily by foreign capital is not stable, since FDI  is highly volatile and 
leads to highly uneven development
38 (Hirst and Thompson, 1996).  
 
Based on the above arguments, we maintain that according to both 
variants of the optimistic view, quite a few of the Arab countries will fall 
within the group of countries that will not benefit from globalization. This 
is because they are major natural resource producers and, furthermore, 
some have also extreme climates that make them subject to severe adverse 
effects that impede their economic growth. On the other hand, according to  29 
the pessimistic view, globalization is not likely to have positive impacts on 
the economic growth of the developing countries and, hence, of the Arab 
countries as part of this group. 
 
We have also concluded in section IV.1 above that, on balance, the 
economic environment under globalization may not be favourable to the 
growth of the Arab countries. This conclusion was based on two sets of 
considerations: general (the crisis of structural over-accumulation, financial 
crises, and GATT/WTO discipline) and specific (oil and foreign 
investment) (see part A of section IV.1 for details).  
 
Moreover, as labour costs typically represent no more than about 20% 
of the cost of the final product in manufacturing in advanced countries, the 
benefits of cheap labour are unlikely to attract products for which RandD 
costs or marketing costs are as significant (or more significant) than labour 
costs (Hirst and Thompson, 1996). In addition, average gross labour 
productivity can be considerably lower in the Arab countries. Despite the 
very low wages in Morocco and Tunisia as compared to the EU countries 
￿about ten times lower￿the very low average gross labour productivity 
raises the unit labour cost considerably. For example, in 1989, the labour 
cost per unit￿defined as the average wage per unit of value added or the 
wage/productivity ratio￿was higher in Tunisia than in Germany, although 
lower than in France and Italy (Boughzala, 1997). 
 
C. The outsourcing of unskilled-labour-intensive products to the Arab 
countries with considerably low wages
39 is likely to have a positive impact 
on employment in those countries. However, this expectation should be 
taken with due caution, since the outsourcing of production to the Arab 
countries (and to the Third World countries in general) is limited. This is 
because a small portion of the world FDI is channeled to the Third World 
countries, and a tiny fraction of this small amount is heading towards the 
Arab countries. As shown above, significantly less than 3% of the total FDI 
flows to the developing countries were attracted to the Arab countries.                   
  
D.  Generally speaking, by lowering the tariff levels and phasing out other 
trade restrictions, trade liberalization helps expand markets. This will 
increase production and, hence, will create more employment opportunities 
in the producer countries. However, such implied benefits of trade 
liberalization on employment will not be equally shared by all countries. 
The lion￿s share of these trade benefits will be received by the 
manufacturing-producing countries, while the smallest share will be going  30 
to the agricultural-producing countries. This is because the Agricultural 
Agreement in GATT 1994 will not liberalize the trade in agricultural goods 
to the same extent as the trade in manufacturing products, even after its full 
implementation. According to this Agreement, all tariffs will be reduced on 
average by 36% (with a minimum of 15% per each tariff line) as compared 
to the base period 1986-88. Also, where export subsidies are used, 
expenditure on subsidies are to be reduced by 36% and the volume of 
subsidized exports is to be decreased by 21% from the base period 1986-
90
40 (Tanner and Swinbank, 1996; Safadi and Laird, 1996). The 
Agricultural Agreement will be fully implemented by the developed 
countries in the year 2001, and by the developing ones at 2005
41.  
 
As is frequently the case in the Third World, the Arab countries are 
mainly producers of agricultural products. A large percentage of the labour 
force in the Arab countries in Group 2 work in the agricultural sector. With 
the exception of Lebanon and Jordan, the percentage of labour force 
working in agriculture in Group 2 countries range from 27% in Syria to 
60% in Sudan; only Oman and Algeria of the Group 1 countries have a 
higher percentage of the labour force in the agriculture sector
42 (see Table 
1). Thus, the impact of trade liberalization on growth and employment 
creation in the Arab countries (and most of the developing countries) will 
be less than in the case of developed economies that are mainly 
manufacturing-producers. 
 
E. Lowering tariffs under trade liberalization threatens the production of 
manufactured goods in most of the Third World countries, including the 
Arab countries. Being unable to compete with the foreign-produced 
products in the domestic and international markets, many of the 
manufacturing industries in those countries will most likely be phased out. 
The result will be a fall in the demand for labour in the manufacturing 
sector in the Third World which may not be compensated for by the 
outsourcing of production from the advanced economies. This is because 
outsourcing helps very few developing countries, as implied by the skewed 
pattern of FDI distribution to this part of the world. As mentioned in Part II 
above, two-thirds of the FDI flowing to the developing countries are 
allocated to ten countries only. Although Egypt is one of the ten privileged 
countries, and one may also add to this group Morocco and Tunisia as 
major recipients of FDI in Arab region, still most of the Arab countries fall 
in the non-privileged group of developing countries which are marginal 
recipients of FDI. Even in Egypt and Tunisia, the percentage of FDI to total 
investment was below 7%, as shown above. Thus, the majority of the Arab  31 
countries are likely to experience falling production and increasing 
unemployment in the manufacturing sector, being unable to compete with 
low-priced foreign manufactured goods after trade liberalization.  
 
However, a study on Morocco carried out in 1983 on employment in 
manufacturing arrived at a different conclusion regarding the effect of trade 
liberalization
43. Based on a certain model, the study concluded that 
employment in the average private sector manufacturing firm was 
unaffected. Many firms adjusted by cutting profit margins and raising 
productivity rather than reducing employment. However, there were 
considerable employment losses to exporters, and publicly-owned firms 
adjusted by hiring low-paid temporary workers (Currie and Harrison, 
1997). On the other hand, the outcome of other studies reviewed by 
Boughzala (1997) on the likely impact of the free trade area (FTA) with the 
EU on employment in Morocco and Tunisia confirmed that the effect of the 
FTA on new employment in the two countries may be marginal or even 
negative, and that unemployment may worsen and exceed the high rates 
already prevailing in the two economies. Boughzala (1997) criticized these 
findings on the basis that they are based on static models
44. Alternatively, 
he used a model with a dynamic framework based on what ought to be
45, 
and not what exists already. His conclusion was that the loss of 
employment can be compensated for if there will be an annual flow of $1 
billion in Tunisia and $2-3 billion in Morocco into low-skilled 
manufacturing. Given the level of FDI flows to Morocco and Tunisia, this 
implies a tripling of the current level of capital flows to the two countries to 
compensate for the expected loss in employment due to globalization (see 
Table 7).  
 
F. The labour clause, which the developed economies are pushing hard to 
enforce through the WTO (despite the strong resistance of the developing 
countries), will have a negative impact on economic growth and 
employment in much of the Third World, including the Arab countries. 
According to the labour clause, no imports will be allowed from countries 
where child labour exists and where working conditions do not abide by 
human rights requirements (Castle et al., 1998). This labour clause, if 
applied, will have detrimental effects on the Arab countries and many other 
developing countries where child labour prevails and where working 
conditions (like wage level, work environment, unionization) do not fulfill 
human rights requirements
46. If the developed countries succeed in 
enforcing the application of this clause by the WTO
47, this implies putting  32 
trade restrictions on goods produced by the Arab countries which have 
child labour and unfavorable working conditions. In particular this factor 
may be important for Mauritania, Yemen and Egypt, where child labour 
represented 23%, 20% and 10%, respectively, of the population in the child 
age-bracket (10-14 years) (Arab League et al., 1999, p.23). The impact of 
this act will be a reduction in economic growth and an increase in 
unemployment in the countries, most of whom suffer already from low 
growth and high unemployment rates, as previously shown. 
 
G.  As expressed by one study, we might be on the verge of a major 
revolution in productivity through advances in robotics and information 
technology, making possible the widespread replacement of human labour 
(Hirst and Thompson, 1996). In this case, the demand for unskilled labour 
will be reduced in all countries, developed and developing. But the latter 
group is the one which is more likely to be hurt most because of the biased 
structure of its labour force is towards unskilled labour. This is another 
potential source for the negative impact of globalization on unemployment 
in the Arab region.  
 
H.  Institutionalization of the market-economy, which is one dimension of 
globalization, will raise unemployment in the economy. This is because one 
of the  important components of the SAP advocated by the IMF and the 
World Bank is the privatization of publicly-owned enterprises. The Arab 
countries have substantial public-sector employment as compared to 
developing and developed countries. Public employment in the Arab 
countries was, on average, 37% of total employment in the period 1987-92, 
as compared to an average of 10% for developing countries and 18% for 
OECD countries (UNESCWA, 1997a, Table II.1 and p.86). 
 
  In the Arab region, public-sector employment is highest in the 
GCC countries, thanks to the practice of  providing well-paid jobs to the 
national labour force, and also because of the states￿ commitment to 
providing extensive social services to the population. In the early nineties, 
public-sector employment in Kuwait and Bahrain was 23% of total 
employment
48. Public sector employment is also high in the Arab countries 
in Group 2; it was 45% of total employment in Jordan in 1987, and was 
34% and 33% in Egypt and Syria respectively (UNESCWA, 1997a, Table 
II.I). 
 
  This large public-sector employment makes the price of the 
institutionalization of the market economy, which is one dimension of 
globalization, high in terms of job losses. Quite a few of the Arab countries  33 
are adopting structural adjustment programmes. Algeria (1994), Egypt 
(1991), Jordan (1992), Morocco (1983), Tunisia (1986) and Mauritania 
(1985) have been applying structural adjustment programmes in 
cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank
49 (Arab League et al., 1994). 
One of the important features of these programmes is the  privatization of 
publicly-owned enterprises. Other Arab countries have independently 
implemented structural adjustment programmes by privatizing the public 
sector (UNESCWA, 1997a). This implies an increase in unemployment 
since privatization is accompanied usually by a reduction in the demand for 
labour.  Moreover, the public sector has always served as employer-of-last-
resort in the Arab countries
50 and, hence, the reduction of its size implies 
the elimination of this role
51.  
 
V.2.  Implications for Poverty 
 
Poverty estimates in the Arab region are available only for some countries. 
Comparison of such estimates cannot be safely made because of differences 
in the methods used in poverty measurement. To minimize this problem, 
we shall depend on one source for reviewing poverty estimates in the Arab 
region, the Human Development Report (UNDP, 1995, 1999). But even in 
this source, poverty data reported for the same country may differ widely 
because of the difference in the estimation methodology used (see Table 
10). It should be noted that the figures in Table 10 are not the only poverty 
estimates for countries included
52 and, also, the Arab countries that are not 
included in the Table do not necessarily lack poverty estimates
53. Thus, the 
estimates in Table 10 should be taken with due caution; they just give an 
idea of the state of poverty in some countries in the Arab region. The Table 
shows that in six out of the eight Arab countries for which data are 
reported, the poor in the nineties included 30% or more of the population at 
the urban and/or rural and/or national level. Those countries are: Egypt, 
Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen, and Mauritania, according to the 
estimates in the two Human Development Reports (1995 and 1999). 
 
Globalization affects poverty through its impact on a number of factors: 
labour earnings, prices of basic commodities and services, and on the scope 
and intensity of the social safety net provided to low-income people. One 
may point out the following likely impacts of globalization on the Arab 
countries, as part of the Third World: 
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A. Globalization is likely to have contradictory impacts on labour earnings: 
First with financial liberalization, capital becomes highly mobile to move 
from one country to another, leaving the countries with high taxes for those 
with lower ones. Thus, in order to attract more capital￿especially FDI￿ 
countries compete with each other to lower the tax rates on capital. This is 
true in all developed and developing countries, but it is of special 
importance to the latter group of countries which try to attract as much FDI 
as possible to raise investment and production, despite their low domestic 
savings. In comparison to capital, labour is  less mobile and hence less able 
to resist higher tax rates. Consequently, it is found that governments are 
imposing relatively high tax rates on labour as compared to capital. 
Moreover, taxes on wages would by necessity have to be high enough to 
compensate for the reduction in government revenue due to the lower taxes 
on capital (Obstfeld, 1998; Feenstra, 1998).  
 
Thus, financial liberalization, which is one dimension of 
globalization, is likely to result in a fall in the net income received by 
workers, who represent the low- and middle-income strata in any society. 
This implies a deterioration in the income distribution pattern since the 
government, by applying this discriminatory tax policy against labour, 
redistributes income in favor of the high-income earners in the society￿the 
capital owners￿and against the low-income group, the wage earners. This 
negative impact of globalization on wages is likely to be greater in the 
developing countries, including the Arab countries, when compared to 
developed ones. The former lack strong labour unions and democratic 
political  systems,  which provide appropriate forums for the different 
groups in the society, workers and others, to express themselves freely and 
defend their interests. 
 
Second,  labour unions are either lacking or weak in the Arab 
countries, and commonly in the Third World. Strong labour unions have 
positive impacts on the standard of living of the workers by raising wages 
and improving working conditions. Globalization is likely to have two 
contradictory impacts on labour unions in the developing countries and the 
Arab countries as part of this group. Institutionalization of the market-
economy, which is one dimension of globalization, implies a stronger role 
for labour unions in the economy. This is supposed to have positive impacts 
on the standard of living and the quality of life of the labour force in the 
developing countries. On the other hand, outsourcing of production, 
another dimension of globalization, is likely to weaken labour unions. This 
is attributed to the severe competition among countries to keep the 
production costs as low as possible to attract foreign direct investments and  35 
boost production. Accordingly, labour unions become more reluctant to ask 
for higher wages in order not to source out production to other countries 
with lower wages and, hence, lost jobs. Considering these two 
contradictory implications of globalization on the labour unions, the final 
outcome of the institutionalization of the market economy in the Arab 
region may not be as beneficial as one might have expected with respect to 
its impact on employment and wages.  As some writers put it, globalization 
implies a ￿race to the bottom￿ with respect to wages (Lee, 1996). 
 
B.  As shown in Table 2, the share of agriculture in GDP is high in most of 
the Arab countries in Group 2, and in Iraq in Group 1. The impact of 
globalization on farmers￿ income in those countries is likely to be positive, 
but the effect on poor farmers can be considerably less. According to the 
Agricultural Agreement, the tariffs and subsidies on agricultural products in 
the developed countries each will be reduced by 36% over a six-years 
period which started in 1995. The reduction of the subsidies will raise 
prices of the currently subsidized agricultural products
54 in international 
markets, while the reduction of tariffs will open the markets of the 
developed countries for the agricultural products produced in the 
developing ones. The positive impact on the farmers￿ income in developing 
countries, and hence on the Arab countries, will be through the rise in 
prices of the agricultural products and the increase in exports. However, 
surveys from several countries indicate that internationally-traded 
commodities account for the minority of the income of the poor farmers. 
This reduces the positive impact of trade liberalization on this group. On 
the other hand, there can be indirect benefit to the rural poor as farm 
labourers, derived from the increase in income of better-off farmers. With 
trade liberalization, this latter group will probably increase their demand for 
labour to produce more export crops (Weeks, 1997). 
 
C.  The impact of globalization on the prices of basic consumer goods￿
which are our main concern when dealing with poverty￿is contradictory. 
Reducing the subsidy on agricultural products in the developed countries, 
according to the Agricultural Agreements, will raise the prices of basic 
agricultural goods (like wheat, corn, and sugar) in the international markets. 
This will raise the cost of living for the consumers, especially hitting the 
poor and the low-income citizens, since they spend a larger proportion of 
their budget on food.  
 
However, to assess the impact of  the likely rise in the prices of 
agricultural products on poverty, we should differentiate between the 
exporting and the importing countries. In the exporting countries, the  36 
impact will be a rise in the cost of living of the urban consumers, while for 
the rural consumers, specifically the farmers, the net impact is disputable. 
This is because they will gain from the rise in agricultural prices as 
producers, but they will lose as consumers
55. The impact of the rise in 
agricultural prices on the importing countries is negative. The cost of living 
will be increased for both urban and rural consumers, with the pinch to be 
felt most by the poor and the low-income people. However, since countries 
are usually exporters and importers at the same time, the impact is not that 
clear-cut when we consider net exporters and net importers of agricultural 
products. One may say, though, that in the net-exporting countries the 
positive impact of the rise in agricultural prices on farmers￿ income as 
producers may exceed the negative impact on raising their cost of living as 
consumers, while the reverse is true in the net-importing countries. 
 
Within the Arab world, all countries except Sudan, Syria and 
Somalia, are net importers of agricultural products according to the 1997 
data (see Table 4)
56. They differ considerably, though, with respect to the 
export-import gap of agricultural products per individual. As shown in 
Table 4, the average net import of agriculture products per individual in 
1997 is considerably higher in the GCC countries and Libya than to the 
Arab countries in Group 2, with the exception of Lebanon. In the major oil-
exporting countries (Group 1), with the exception of Iraq and Algeria, the 
average net import of agricultural products per individual in 1997 was 
above $200 (and was as high as $550 in Kuwait), as compared to an 
average of less than $70 in Group 2 countries, with the exception of 
Lebanon, Jordan and Djibouti.  Syria and Sudan had a net export of 
agricultural product per individual amounting to $20 and $7 respectively. 
 
The low average net import of agriculture products per individual 
in most of the Arab countries in Group 2 has positive implications for the 
Arab region. It will reduce the likely impact of the expected rise in prices of 
agricultural products on increasing poverty in the region, since most of the 
large net importers of agricultural products are the countries with relatively 
high income per capita (see Table 2). Given the relatively low income per 
capita level in Group 2, the Arab countries that are likely to be hurt most by 
the rise in agricultural prices are Lebanon, Jordan and Djibouti, judging by 
the average net import of agricultural products per individual, which was 
$312, $139 and $121 respectively in 1997 (see Table 4).  
 
On the other hand, the prices of the manufactured products, 
including the basic ones (like clothing), will likely be reduced due to trade  37 
liberalization. All the Arab countries are major importers of manufactured 
products. Given the likely increase in the prices of agricultural products and 
the likely fall in the prices of the manufactured goods, the net effect on the 
cost of living of the population in the Arab region is not entirely clear. For 
the poor, it is more likely that their cost of living will be increased, because 
of the high share spent on food in their budget. However, the percentage 
rise in their cost of living is expected to be less than the rise in the prices of 
agricultural products, because part of the increase in the prices of food will 
be compensated for by the fall in the prices of basic manufactured products. 
 
D.  The extension of protection for inventions may promote monopoly and 
raise the cost of basic goods, which will hurt the population of the Arab 
countries (and Third World countries in general), especially those with low-
incomes. The majority of patents are located in the advanced economies. It 
is estimated by one study that only 1% of the patents in the world are 
owned by the Third World countries, and some 84% of all patents are 
owned by MNCs from the five richest countries (Schaeffer, 1997). 
 
One of the serious impacts of the TRIPS agreement is the raising of 
the prices of drugs and food, which are basic commodities. Canada, for 
example, protects drug patents for only seven to ten years, about half the 
duration of US patents. This has resulted in keeping the drug prices in 
Canada at a level 32% lower than the drug prices in the US (Schaeffer, 
1997 p.204).  In addition to drugs, there is a proposal to extend patent 
protection to seed and agricultural chemical companies
57. Extending patent 
protection to this area means that farmers pay royalties on seeds saved from 
the previous harvest which will raise the cost of food production. Seed 
companies claim that they need patent protection to protect costly 
inventions. The irony of this situation is that much of the raw material for 
new drugs, seeds and chemicals come from rain forests and the farms and 
gardens of poor people in the Third World, without even being paid for, in 
many cases
58 (Schaeffer, 1997). Thus, by extending patent protection to 
drugs and seeds, prices of essential goods (drugs and food) will rise in the 
Arab countries as well as in other parts of  the world. This will hurt 
consumers everywhere, but most particularly the poor. In the Arab region, 
the harm will be greater for Group 2 countries, where the income per capita 
is relatively low and the level of poverty is high when compared to that of 
the major oil-exporting countries (Group 1).  
 
Moreover, extending protection for inventions will likely raise 
prices on high-tech commodities, which may become beyond the reach of  38 
increasing numbers of the inhabitants in the low- and lower middle-income 
Arab countries (Group 2); this applies also to many other developing 
countries. The likely result is a widening of the technological and income 
gaps between the Arab countries (and the developing countries in general) 
and the advanced industrial countries. The expectation that globalization 
will narrow the already wide gap between the developed and developing 
countries
59 by creating a ￿borderless world￿ is likely to be a myth.  
 
E.  Another negative impact of globalization on prices will be through the 
GATT ban on export restrictions. This will have negative effects on the 
economies and people in the developed and developing countries; but its 
negative impact could be devastating for the developing countries 
(Schaeffer, 1997). Countries may limit the export of raw material in order 
to reduce the total supply of the commodity in the international markets and 
raise the price accordingly. Banning these export restrictions through 
GATT will have a favorable impact on consumers everywhere, because 
they will be able to get those commodities at low prices. But this will have 
an unfavorable impact on the exporting countries because it forces a 
deterioration in their terms of trade. Lower prices for their main exports 
will make it more difficult for those countries￿especially the developing 
ones￿to pay for their imports, repay debts, and invest their earnings in 
domestic development projects, thus creating more employment 
opportunities and raising the standard of living of their inhabitants. In the 
case of food, prohibiting export restrictions could be devastating for the 
agricultural Arab countries, especially the low-income ones such as Sudan, 
Mauritania and Yemen, where GNP per capita is below $400 a year (Table 
2). If a country had a bad harvest, and its government could not restrict the 
export of its food crop according to GATT, domestic food supplies could 
fall and prices rise, which will hurt mostly the poor people in the society. 
This ban on restricting exports is also potentially relevant for the Arab 
countries in the case of oil and gas, but it may not have as strong an impact 
on poverty. 
 
F. A social safety net is among the most important and effective means of 
reducing poverty.  Subsidizing basic consumer goods and social services 
(education and health) by the government provides a social safety net for 
the low-income people in the society.  This group of people includes all 
those whose incomes fall below the poverty line (like the receivers of 
pensions, social insurance, and transfer payments). The governments in the 
Arab countries provide a social safety net, in one form or another, to protect 
the vulnerable groups in the society.  One of the social safety net indicators 
is public expenditure on education. The share of the average expenditure on  39 
education in total government expenditure in the Arab countries in the mid-
nineties amounted to 15.8% as compared to an average ratio of 14.8% for 
the developing countries, and a ratio of 12.3% for the industrialized 
countries (UNDP, 1999, Table 10). According to the most recent data 
(1998), the highest ratio was in the low- and middle-income Arab countries 
(Group 2); this ratio was 24.9% in Morocco, 20.8% in Yemen and 19.8% in 
Jordan. In the major oil-exporting countries, the highest public education 
expenditure ratio is in Oman (17.8%), Saudi Arabia (17.0%), UAE (16.7%) 
and Algeria (16.4%) (see Table 3).  
 
Another indicator for the social safety net is the ratio of 
government social expenditure to total expenditure. On average, 
government social expenditure is one-quarter of the total expenditure in the 
Arab countries in 1998. At the country level, the percentage of government 
social expenditure in total expenditure in all the major oil-exporting 
countries (Group 1) was 20% and more in the GCC countries, with the 
exception of UAE, and was as high as 42.8% and 57.6% in Algeria and 
Libya respectively (Table 3). In Group 2 countries, out of the eight 
countries for which data were available, the ratio was about one-quarter and 
more in five countries: Tunisia (38%), Jordan (44.3%), Yemen (27.1%), 
Morocco (26.2%) and Egypt (23.5%). 
 
What is the likely effect of globalization on the social safety nets 
that protect the poor economically and socially in the Arab countries? 
Institutionalization of the market-economy system in those countries by 
means of IMF-WB SAPs implies phasing out subsidies on basic goods and 
services to reduce the deficit in the government budget.  Moreover, 
globalization in itself is likely to have negative impacts on social safety 
nets in all countries, advanced and developing, because of the implied 
reduction in government revenue. This is due to the cuts in customs tariffs 
and taxes on capital as mentioned above
60, and also due to the weakening of 
the sovereignty of the state which reduces a government￿s ability to raise 
revenue (Lee, 1996). The fall in government revenues due to the mentioned 
factors reduces government￿s ability to spend on social services and to 
provide the necessary funding to cover the cost of the social safety net. The 
likely weakening of the social safety net in the Arab countries due to these 
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The likely negative impacts of globalization on Third World countries in 
general and the Arab countries in particular may exceed the positive 
impacts.  As pointed out by one study (Mittelman, 1997), the social 
structure of the world is shaped by globalization in the form of a three-part 
hierarchy that prevails both among and within countries.  At the top are 
people who are integrated into the global economy, including everyone 
from the managers down to the relatively privileged workers who serve 
global production and finance in reasonably stable jobs. The middle level in 
the hierarchy includes those who serve the global economy in more 
insecure jobs; this comprises an expanding group segmented by race, 
religion and sex as a result of the global restructuring of production.  The 
bottom level consists of those who are excluded from the global economy 
and serve it only as a potentially destabilizing force.  The whole region of 
Africa is classified by Mittelman (1997) as belonging to the bottom level
63.  
We should add that the Arab countries and all the developing countries, 
including the NICs, belong to the second and third categories
64.  However, 
despite the likely negative impacts of globalization on the developing 
countries, no one country could afford, we believe, to opt out of this 
process; the price it will pay in this case is likely to be much higher than the 
benefit.  This is much more so for the Arab countries in view of the small 
size of their economies; none of them belong to the league of the 30 largest 
economies according to the size of GNP (for 1998). 
 
Consequently, the question that should be raised with respect to the 
Arab countries is: which policies can be applied at the national, regional 
and international levels to minimize the negative implications of 
globalization and to maximize its positive impacts on their economies?  We 
shall attempt to answer this question with respect to policies relevant to the 
economic and social impacts of globalization, with particular attention to 
growth and sectoral structure, vulnerability, employment and poverty.  It 
should be emphasized, though, that this question is too important to be 
tackled in just one study.  Thorough and detailed studies should be made by 
competent professionals in order to provide a consistent package of policies 
that address the likely negative impacts of globalization at all levels: 
economically, socially, educationally, politically, etc.  The gloomy future 
that most of the Arab countries are likely to face soon, especially when the 
concessions periods given by the GATT 1994 are over, necessitates urgent 
policy action.  41 
 
VI.1.  At the National Level 
 
A.  The governments in the Arab countries should focus on accelerating 
growth. Economic growth is the engine for employment creation and 
poverty reduction, if coupled with appropriate policy measures for income 
redistribution in favor of the low-income strata in the society.  Not only the 
rate of growth, but also the sectoral structure is of vital importance, because 
of its implications for employment and income distribution. For the 
densely-populated countries (like Egypt), and also for the countries with 
high unemployment rates (like most of the Arab countries), greater 
emphasis should be placed on labour-intensive methods of production. 
Accepting some trade-off between productivity and employment may be 
necessary, as the Arab countries should strike a balance between their 
needs and the latest technology available in the global arena
65.  
 
Giving more consideration to the labour inputs and the technique 
chosen in production will not only create more jobs in the economy, but the 
share of wages in national income may be raised too.  This implies that the 
pattern of income distribution generated by economic growth will favour 
the low- and middle-income groups in the society.  
 
However, in view of the increasing role of FDI within globalization, 
this kind of technological choice is not open to the Arab countries on an 
individual basis.  Survival in globalization implies that production is likely 
to be led by the MNCs and strong foreign investors who usually apply the 
latest technology available. Only when the Arab countries cooperate 
effectively to establish a regional bloc, might this kind of technological 
choice be feasible to consider. The success of GAFTA
66 will ultimately 
strengthen the negotiating position of individual Arab countries vis-à-vis 
MNCs regarding appropriate technology. 
 
B.  The shift from a state-managed economy to a market-economy, which 
is part of  globalization, does not appear favorable to employment in the 
Arab countries. An increase in unemployment has been a common outcome 
of privatization and the strong contractionary fiscal and monetary policies 
applied to achieve financial stability, which are innate features of the IMF-
WB SAPs implemented by the countries. Thus, the Arab countries are 
embarking on globalization with rising supply of and low demand for 
labour, which will likely magnify the negative social impacts of 
globalization in these countries. Consequently, much emphasis should be  42 
placed on raising the overall rate of capital accumulation by mobilizing 
investments from all sources: private and governmental, domestic and 
foreign.  
 
Privatization should not mean the complete withdrawal of the 
government from investment. Part of the returns from the sale of public 
enterprises should be directed to building new enterprises, especially in the 
manufacturing sector, and to creating more employment opportunities.‎‎‎‎‎‎‎‎‎‎‎‎‎ This 
does not necessarily imply downplaying the private sector and the shift  to a 
market economy. The relative weight of the private sector will continue to 
increase as long as the private sector grows at a rate higher than the public 
sector, which is one of the policy targets in the SAPs. Besides, ownership 
and management could be separated; i.e., government  invests and owns 
projects, but the management could be left to the private sector. Leaving 
the main responsibility of economic growth and employment creation in the 
Arab countries entirely to the private sector is almost impossible, especially 
under GATT/ WTO rules. In many Arab countries, the private sector is still 
nascent, and the challenges of globalization are too tough to be handled. 
Despite the current crisis in the NICs, the lessons of their development 
experience cannot be disregarded.  They clearly show the importance of the 
government￿s role in accelerating growth, if properly designed. Although 
some important instruments for government intervention are prohibited 
under GATT 1994, there is still some room to maneouvre: support for 
research and development, infant industries, regional development and the 
environment. The potential here remains to be tapped.   
 
C.  A high rate of investment is a precondition for fast growth. For a high 
rate of investment to be sustainable, it should be consistent with 
macroeconomic stability.  Large external borrowing and/or expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policies should be avoided.  Excessive dependence on 
foreign investment is more likely to render the economy vulnerable to 
external factors (as in the Latin American countries) (Hirst and Thompson, 
1996; Khan and Muqtada, 1997).  Achieving and sustaining a high rate of 
investment requires a high rate of domestic saving.  Country experiences 
have shown that steady growth is the result of investments that are financed 
primarily by domestic savings (as in the case of East- and South-East Asian 
countries), Thus, raising domestic savings should be one of the primary 
concerns of the Arab countries if steady economic growth is opted for. In 
particular, authorities should avoid the easy but dangerous option of 
smoothing expenditure over the course of oil cycles at the expense of 
saving.  
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D.  In the Arab countries, more effort and resources should be directed 
toward catching up with the fast technological progress that is taking place 
in the advanced economies.  There is a dire need for providing the scientific 
infrastructure and research environment that are capable of producing 
competent professionals in the different fields of social and hard sciences
67.  
Furthermore, lack of attention to the research activity by production firms 
is common in the Third World countries.  Despite the importance of R&D 
in raising productivity and accelerating economic growth, it is felt that 
national research institutions have not earned sufficient credibility to justify 
extending the necessary support to them. For example, industrialists in the 
African countries are seeking answers to their technological problems 
abroad (UNESCO, 1998).  This applies as well to the Arab countries.  
 
Increasing the private sector￿s demand for R&D in the Arab countries 
is necessary, especially in manufacturing, because of the strong correlation 
between technology developments and production growth.  Policies should 
be applied to provide the necessary scientific infrastructure, competent 
professionals and research institutes, to produce serious research.  This 
means overhauling the education system at all levels in the Arab countries.  
Having competent scientists and professionals, especially in basic sciences, 
is a must for the Arab countries to reap the benefit of globalization, e.g., 
competent scientists can adapt technological innovations to the needs of the 
Arab economies to fit the relative abundance of human resources and 
relative scarcity of capital in those countries.  This is one important way to 
reduce the present marginalization of the Arab countries in the world 
economy. 
 
Contrary to what some may believe, the financial constraint is not the 
binding one for such an objective.  To improve the quality of research 
produced in the Arab countries, it takes much more than just funding
68.  
The quality of research is a function of both the scientific background and 
training of researchers and the research environment.  A coherent national 
policy for science and technology is needed to address national priorities in 
this vital area. 
 
E.  The Arab countries cannot continue to rely for their comparative 
advantage on low-cost unskilled labour and natural resources, since both 
factors represent a diminishing share in the value added in virtually all 
products, thanks to the advances in technology
69.  This implies that the 
Arab countries have to acquire new bases for comparative advantage to be 
able to attract foreign investments and create new jobs.  For example, the  44 
Arab countries with a high population growth rate might be able to 
substitute the comparative advantage in cheap unskilled labour by a new 
comparative advantage in low-cost semi-skilled and skilled labour, if they 
succeed in restructuring their education system and build a scientific 
infrastructure suitable to accelerating technological change that accompany 
the globalization process. ‎‎ 
 
F.  A high population growth rate is an important factor that the Arab 
countries should take care of to reduce the negative social impacts of 
globalization.  High population growth means a large increase in the supply 
of labour, which intensifies the unemployment problem in these countries. 
Thus, reducing the population growth rate should be one of the important 
policy targets in these countries. 
 
G.  In view of the potentially destabilizing effect of foreign portfolio 
investment (FPI), small, open economies such as those of the Arab 
countries need to put in place some controls on the convertibility of the 
capital account
70.  This has often been referred to in the literature as the 
￿sand in the wheel￿ policy.  The local banking system has to be monitored 
carefully to avoid accumulation of short-term debt denominated in foreign 
currency.  
 
Among the Arab countries, the GCC countries, Egypt and Lebanon all 
have full capital mobility, while Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia have 
partially liberalized their capital account (Arab League et al., 1996, Ch. 7).  
The increase in foreign syndicated bank loans and banking facilities to the 
Arab countries in 1998 represented the main component of the growth of 
long-term net capital inflows to these countries.  An increasing number of 
Arab banks, particularly in Egypt and the GCC, continued their practice of 
co-participation with foreign banks to mobilize funds for development 
projects, mainly in the energy sector, through syndicated loans (The Arab 
League et al., 1999, 97).  The practice in Chile and Colombia of imposing 
extra reserve requirements on such claims proved successful, whereas 
uncontrolled short-term private bank debt in foreign currencies, was fatal to 
the Indonesian and Korean currencies in 1997 (Tobin, 1998)
71.  
Denominating a large amount of debt, especially short-term debt in foreign 
currencies should be avoided.  In 1997, the overall ratio of short-term debt 
to total foreign debt for the Arab countries averaged 12%. But it was 
significantly higher for several countries: the Sudan (43%), Syria (23%), 
Oman (21%), Yemen (16%) and Tunisia (14%) (Arab League et al., 1999, 
Appendix Table 9/8). This is the hard lesson of the Mexican peso crisis of  45 
1994-95 (Mishkin, 1996).  There are many disturbing parallels between 
some Arab countries now, notably Egypt, and Mexico before 1994 (Abdel-
Khalek, 1998).  
 
H.  Pegged or fixed exchange rates should be avoided, as experience in 
Mexico and East Asian countries proved that pegged currency can be an 
easy target for speculative attacks. The danger is much more grave when 
the banking system is fragile, as it is the case in the Arab countries
72.  We 
have shown that although the number of countries having a floating 
exchange rate increased from 6 to 8 between 1995 and 1998, 12 countries 
still apply a peg of some sort.  Having a pegged exchange rate regime 
combined with the features mentioned in G. above, amounts to ￿putting the 
economy on a knife￿s edge: one slip and the economy comes crashing 
down￿(Mishkin, 1996, p.59).  It is therefore prudent policy to restructure 
exchange regimes in the Arab countries away from the peg.      
 
VI.2.  At the Regional Level 
 
A.  In terms of economic size (measured by the level of GDP), all the Arab 
countries are small, some really tiny; none of them belongs to the list of the 
30 largest economies.  In fact, their combined GDP in 1998 is less than that 
of Canada, only 40% of that of France and just 7% of that of the USA.  For 
theses countries, they can only face the challenges of globalization if they 
form a solid regional bloc.  Ironically, the countries that have joined 
successful regional blocs are the advanced economies, which have already 
￿smooth￿ integration in globalization; the two largest regional blocks, the 
EU and NAFTA
73, consist mainly of developed countries.  
 
  Of particular interest from the vantage point of the Arab countries 
is the modest step already taken by establishing GAFTA, to be completed 
in the year 2007.  The Arab countries need to accelerate the process of 
integration and quickly establish a customs union.  Only by creating their 
own autonomous customs territory can the Arab countries collectively 
maximize their development potential within the global economy.  
 
Becoming a member of a sub-regional grouping is vital for the 




1.  Competition among the firms producing homogeneous products within 
the regional bloc will end up in phasing out the least efficient firms in the  46 
Arab region and strengthening the more efficient ones, since the enlarged 
market resulting from economic integration allows economies of scale in 
production and specialization. This may also create specialization in 
differentiated products, which will lead to intra-industry trade, as it has 
been the case in the EU.  Increased competition in the regional bloc may be 
looked at as an introductory phase that prepares the Arab firms to reach a 
wider market outside the region, and getting integrated smoothly into the 
global market.  The manufacturing firms that survive the competition in the 
region will more likely reach a standard of production that will enable them 
to compete in the global market. These firms would not be able to survive 
in the region if they do not succeed in competing in quality with similar 
products of the non-member countries, since the member countries have the 
choice to import from outside the region at low tariffs according to the 
GATT, if they are not satisfied with the product of the regional firms. 
 
2. Regionalization may lead to an increase in production in the commodity 
sectors (manufacturing and agriculture) by the division of production 
activities among the Arab countries in a complementary way, taking into 
consideration the capabilities and potential of the countries in the region.  
In the cases where similarity in comparative advantage in the Arab 
countries exists, some kind of agreement can take place to compensate for 
the loss that a member country may experience if it has to close certain 
lines of production.  In short, the regional bloc represents a kind of smaller 
global economy in which the member countries are the main players and 
can then put in place the appropriate rules and regulations that fit their 
conditions.  
 
This does not mean, though, that the Arab countries are completely 
free in designing and implementing their production and trade policies, 
since the GATT rules are binding constraints to them. But despite that, they 
have room to move and maneuver by isolating themselves as a group with 
preferential rules which they can apply to the member countries, and which 
are allowed by the GATT
75. These preferential rules give each member 
country an edge over the non-member countries within the regional bloc, 
which should have a positive impact on the trade and production of the 
member countries in GAFTA, and could present a transitory phase for them 
to be introduced to the globalization process in a smoother way. 
  
3.  By reducing tariffs among member countries to a level lower than with 
the non-members, and eventually eliminating them completely, the intra-
trade within the Arab region will increase, substituting part of the trade 
which is taking place between non-members and member countries for  47 
similar products. Moreover, the creation of intra-industry trade, as the result 
of specialization in heterogeneous products, is an additional factor that will 
enhance intra-trade within the regional bloc.   
 
4.  The regional bloc may lead to increased foreign investment in the Arab 
countries as non-member countries build plants inside the bloc in order to 
avoid the tariff barriers. For example, the USA increased its investments in 
Europe following the creation of the European Economic Community. 
 
5.  Since regional trading blocs involve few countries, it becomes more 
feasible to agree among them on ways to reduce the transactions costs of 
international trade through harmonization of standards, dissemination of 
information leading to a reduction in risk, removal of bureaucratic controls, 
etc.  Moreover, the Arab countries become more capable, as a regional 
bloc, to persuade large non-member countries or other trading blocs, to 
engage in reciprocal tariff reductions.  The outcome will be an increase in 
intra-trade and production in the Arab region.  As pointed out by Mittelman 
(1997), many Asian countries and firms look to improve regional 
cooperation for access to regional markets and as a sound base for sharing 
in globalization.  
 
We may underscore two factors in this respect: first, working as a 
group in the division of production within the member countries of the 
Arab region means that the regional pattern of production will be supported 
by the resources (human and financial) of the whole region and not by the 
resources of one country only, which may relatively be too small to stand 
the competition in the global market.  Second, the sovereignty of the state is 
maintained within regionalization, which makes room for the governments 
of the Arab countries to play effective roles in supporting the economic 
activities in the region by appropriate policies.  A common element that is 
found among the different regional blocs is that the state is increasingly a 
mechanism in the globalization process and, hence, intervenes directly in 
the economy to promote capital accumulation (Mittelman, 1997).  Thus, 
cooperation in regional blocs is an extremely important step that should be 
accelerated by the Arab countries.  
 
B.  The Arab countries may benefit considerably by setting up a facility for 
common strategic food reserves.  As pointed out, most of them are net food 
importers.  Their food security may be greatly enhanced if they establish 
such a facility.  Details could easily be worked out; the point here is to 
draw attention to this neglected problem.   
  48 
VI.3.  At the International Level 
 
A.  The Arab countries need to join forces with other developing countries, 
perhaps with Group of 15, to redress the imbalances and injustices in the 
globalized economic environment. Special attention has to be given to 
GATT/WTO, and its relation to UNCTAD.  The basic difference between 
the two is which comes first, trade or development?  Under GATT/WTO, 
trade is first and foremost, then development.  If there is any conflict 
between the two, trade should prevail.  Under UNCTAD, development is 
first, and trade follows.  From the point of view of the developing 
countries, the Uruguay Round must be seen as a setback.  The Arab 
countries, as part of the Third World, should push for an assessment of the 
results of the Uruguay Round before moving forward to the Millenium 
round.  The Uruguay Round was advocated in terms of efficiency, 
competition and a level-playing field.  In reality, it is economic Darwinism 
in disguise.  
 
B. The Agreement on Agriculture in GATT 1994 stipulates liberalization of 
agricultural trade, the consequence of which is to raise the prices of many 
temperate products.  Simulations produce a wide range of predictions for 
the rise in prices.  Of particular interest to the Arab countries are cereals, 
dairy products, meat and sugar.  For these products, price increases as a 
result of the Uruguay round (based on general equilibrium models) range as 
follows: 15-18% for wheat, 10-18% for meat, 14-1% for dairy and 57% for 
sugar (Laird and McDonald, 1996, Table VI). UNCTAD estimated annual 
losses from higher food prices and the erosion of preferences for the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) at $300-$600 million.  Article 16(2) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture established a Committee on Agriculture within 
the WTO with the mandate of monitoring the follow￿up to the ￿Decision 
on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform 
Programme on Least-Developed countries (LDCs) and Net Food-Importing 
Developing Countries (NFIDCs)￿.  But very little has been achieved.  The 
Arab countries, led by Saudi Arabia (when it joins WTO) and Egypt as the 
largest net food-importing countries in the region (Table 4), should press 
for the establishment of a Food Import Facility (FIF) through the WTO, not 
through the IMF.  The justification of having a FIF within WTO instead of 
the Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF) within the 
IMF is that the latter involves strong conditionality (Abdel-Khalek, 1996, 
Ch. 10).  The FIF should operate as a commercial insurance scheme 
without conditionality, like the Stabex scheme
76 in Lome I (Raffer, 1997).    
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C. While the Arab countries and the developing countries should 
concentrate their efforts on raising their savings rate to guarantee steady 
investments and growth, they must be helped by international action.   
Measures needed include debt reduction and an increase in the share of 
grants in capital flow, in order to increase the inflow of foreign savings 
without the danger of increased indebtedness (Khan and Muqtada, 1997).  
This endeavour is highly important for the Arab countries since 15 of them 




D. One of the issues that needs to be addressed by the international 
community, and which has not been tackled by the tariffs reduction 
agreements in the GATT, is the escalated tariffs used by the developed 
countries to discriminate against manufactured products in the developing 
countries. The developed countries typically levy low tariffs on raw 
material imported from developing countries, but high tariffs on their 
manufactured goods to discourage them from making goods that might 
compete with the developed countries￿ producers
78.  Across-the-board tariff 
reduction might benefit consumers, but it would leave in place the 
discriminatory tariff structures that hurt the developing countries 
(Schaeffer, 1997).  Thus, before moving toward any further trade 
liberalization under the Millenium Round, the structure of tariffs, and not 
only the level of tariffs, should be discussed and revised to eliminate the 
discrimination that exists against some products of the developing 
countries, like the manufactured goods.  
 
E. Other issues in the GATT may have similar discriminatory impacts 
against the developing countries, which means that the Arab countries in 
the broader context of the Third World, assisted by the international 
community as a whole, should be concerned with investigating and revising 
GATT￿s regulations to eliminate other discrimination that may exist in the 
agreement.  In view of the paramount importance of oil for the Arab 
countries, it qualifies for the status of a sensitive commodity which should 
be subject only gradually to the free market discipline of GATT. Some 
analysts even extend that to petrochemicals (Al Sahlawi, 2000). 
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F. To avoid the expected marginalization of the South, a different 
perception by advanced countries and international organizations is needed 
with respect to the role that the developing countries could play in 
globalization.  Despite the heterogeneity of the developing economies, they 
still have common problems that need to be addressed by the international 
community, and should be considered in designing the regulations and rules 
of globalization as reflected in GATT.  Otherwise, these countries will 
largely be excluded, ipso-facto, from the benefits of globalization, which 
will sooner or later have its unfavorable impacts on the advanced 
economies.  It is unrealistic to assume that the marginalization of the Third 
World countries is irrelevant to the benefits of globalization that will accrue 
to the advanced economies.  Poverty and prosperity cannot coexist for long 
in the ￿borderless￿ world of globalization.  The nascent Group of 20 
(established in 1999 and including the seven industrialized countries, 11 
other countries that represent the newly emerging markets
79, and the 
representatives of two international organizations), may reflect this 
changing perception. The objective of this Group is to support and enhance 
world cooperation on various economic issues, and to coordinate among the 




Although the establishment of this Group of 20 is one step in the 
right direction, the countries included do not provide a fair representation 
of the Third World.  The developing countries in Africa and in the Arab 
region are largely neglected.  Africa is presented by one country only, 
South Africa, which by several criteria is considered a developed economy; 
the Arab region is presented only by Saudi Arabia.  The choice of the 
member countries in the Group of 20 is heavily biased towards the 
developing countries in Asia (China, India, South Korea, and Turkey) and 
in Latin America (Argentine, Brazil, and Mexico); also, the low-income 
countries are poorly represented.  To have an operationally effective 
mechanism for cooperation between the North and the South, the member 
countries in the Group of 20 can be increased to provide a better 
representation of the Third World, or another Group could be formed which 
should include low-income developing countries along with the medium-
income countries and the newly emerging markets.   
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  In conclusion, two points may be emphasized: First, the economic 
and social problems of the Arab countries and the developing countries in 
general are more likely to be increased than reduced by globalization.   
Finding solutions to overcome the current economic and social difficulties 
in the developing economies is beyond these countries￿ means; close 
cooperation with advanced economies and international organizations is 
needed for this purpose
81.  Second, without the cooperation between the 
South (with its heterogeneous economic and social characteristics) and the 
North, the full potential of globalization cannot be achieved, and the losers 
will not only be the developing economies￿Arab and others￿but the 
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figures, see Korayem (1996; Table 1). 
12 For the 1993 ratios, see Korayem (1996, Table 1). 
13 Sachs (1998) invokes yet another distinction: that between tropical versus temperate zone 
countries. He argues that the first may suffer the burden of poor agricultural conditions and 
infectious disease.  
14 Sachs acknowledges the existence of two exceptions. The first is based on geography, as 
when the economy is isolated from the world market. The second is based on climate, such 
as the case of tropical countries which suffer from infections diseases and poor agricultural 
conditions. 
15 For more detailed data and analysis of demographic and labour force trends over the 
period 1960￿1990, see Sirageldin and Al-Khaled (1997) and Karshenas (1997). 
16 The price of crude oil jumped from $3.1 per barrel in 1973 to $10.4 per barrel in 1974, 
and from $12.9 per barrel in 1978 to $29.2 per barrel in 1979 and further to $36.0 in 1980. 
Deflated by the index of industrial countries￿ manufacturing exports unit value (MUV), the 
real price of oil hit a record high in 1980. See Appendix 5/4 of the Arab League et al., 1999.  
17 Calculated from: Arab League and others, 1999; Appendix Table 5/6. 
18 For the 1998 figure, see Table 2 in the text; for the 1993 figure, see the Arab League et 
al., 1994, Appendix Table 2/5.  
19 For an extensive discussion of the oil-remittance nexus and its impact on the labour 
market in the case of Egypt, see Karshenas, 1997. 
20 Mainly for these reasons, the World Bank has revised downward its long-term (2002-
2008) forecasts for growth in developing countries from 5.2% per annum in the Global 
Economic Prospects (World Bank, 1998/99) to 4.9% in the Global Economic Prospects 
(World Bank, 2000b).  
21 In  1997, global foreign exchange transactions amounted to the equivalent of  $1.5 trillion 
per day, compared to $82 billion GDP per day and world exports of $16 billion per day 
(Naggar, 2000). 
22 The corresponding shares in world production are 28% and 14% for oil and gas 
production respectively, according to the 1998 figures. See Arab League et al., Annexes 
5/12 and 5/13. 
23 Iraq had 100 billion barrels of proven reserves, second only to Saudi Arabia. It also has 
some underdeveloped super giant and giant fields that, when fully developed, could raise 
Iraq￿s proven reserves by at least 50%. Prior to the Gulf war, Iraq was producing more that 3 
million barrels per day and exporting  2.8 million barrels per day. For more details, see 
Sullivan (1998). 
24 See footnote 9 in the text. 
25 To use imagery borrowed from the Arab environment, portfolio flows may be compared 
with swarms of locusts from the desert invading the green fields.  53 
                                                                                                                                      
26 In fact, the share of extractive industries was especially low in 1998 because of the oil 
bust. Allowing for this, the share of extractive industries in GDP is really higher than 
revealed by Table 2. By definition, the shares of the other sectors are lower. 
27 Engel￿s Law stipulates that as income rises, a lower proportion thereof will be spent on 
necessities. Agriculture is generally where necessities are produced, and services are less 
necessary than agriculture products. Hence the Law. 
28 Unfortunately, solid data are conspicuously lacking; one has to rely on circumstantial 
evidence. Investments in petrochemicals rose significantly in the 1980￿s, resulting in more 
than 9.0 million tonnes increase of productive capacity; 60% of the increase was in basic 
chemicals in Saudi Arabia (Abdel-Khalek, 1987b, p. 84). Planned production capacity in 
Saudi Arabia, which is to go on stream in the year 2000, totalled 1.738 million tones of  
Ethylene, Polyethylene and Propylene (Arab League et al., 1999).    
29It should be noted that efforts for regional cooperation predate the above-mentioned ones, 
particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab Maghreb Union in the 
1980￿s. In addition to these efforts at regionalism, a number of bilateral free trade areas 
(FTAs) has emerged, mainly to counter some of the effects of  the Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreement (EMAAs). Egypt signed  bilateral agreements with Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia; Morocco signed bilateral agreements with Tunisia and 
Jordan. Tunisia signed an agreement with Jordan.  Syria and Lebanon signed an agreement 
also (Zarrouk and Zallio, 2000). 
30 This is because until the 1997 World Development Report, remittances were recorded 
separately. Starting with the 1998/99 Report, they were included partly in item called ￿net 
income￿ and partly in the item called ￿net current transfers￿. See Technical Notes  to the 
1997 and 1998/99 Reports  for details. 
31 For measures 1 and 2 in 1993, see Korayem (1996). 
32 See the roundtable discussion in Sabri, 1999,  pp. 233￿78. 
33 For more details on the subject, see Lall (1995). 
34 Calculated from Table 7. 
35 In 1997, total investment was $6914 million in Morocco, $15300 million in Egypt and 
$5075 million in Tunisia (The Arab League et al., 1999, Appendix Table 2/6). 
36 Total investment in Yemen was $1605 million in 1997 (The Arab League et al., 1999; 
Appendix Table 2/6). 
37 It consists of the Russian Federation, Turkey, and Poland. 
38 For other views on the negative impacts on the developing countries, see Thomas and 
Wilkin (1997)  
39 For example, average annual labour cost in manufacturing in Tunisia in 1993 was 10.5% 
and 8.6% of the comparable labour cost in France and Germany respectively (Boughzala, 
1997). In Indonesia, the wage is 2% of the wage in Germany; it is $0.5 an hour in the former 
as compared to $25 an hour in the latter (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p. 117). 
40 It is argued also that the actual extent of liberalization of agricultural markets resulting 
from the 36% reduction in tariffs by developed countries at the end of the implementation 
period is likely to be ￿far less￿ than what the figure suggests. One of the reasons brought up 
in this regard is that the tariff rates in the base period 1986-88 were relatively high compared 
to more representative periods because of the considerably low prices of agricultural goods 
in these years. Consequently, the tariff rate applied on agricultural products after the 36%  54 
                                                                                                                                      
reduction will be higher than what it would have been if the base period was more 
representative of the average tariff level (Tanner and Swinbank, 1996). 
41 The Agricultural Agreement came in effect in 1995 (Tanner and Swinbank, 1996, p. 629). 
42 The large employment in the agriculture sector in Oman could be explained by the heavy 
direct and indirect subsidies provided to agriculture activities, including fisheries 
(UNESCWA, 1997, p.74). 
43 In 1983, as a result of payments crisis, Morocco virtually eliminated quantitative 
restrictions on imports and reduced the maximum tariff from 165% to 45% over a six year 
period (Currie and Harrison, 1997). 
44 Those models assumed that all basic parameters ￿import and export elasticities, 
technology and the structure of preferences￿ remain unchanged when the trade barriers are 
completely dismantled (Boughzala, 1997).   
45 It is assumed that Morocco and Tunisia are moving up to the grade of a medium-skill 
country, and they will have the capacity to develop and export more advanced products. It is 
assumed also that firms will behave more efficiently and adopt international requirements 
when protection is lifted and the FTA with the EU will increase foreign direct investment 
(Boughzala, 1997).  
46 Although on moral grounds child labour is rejected, it is argued that eliminating market 
access to goods produced by child labour may hurt the children themselves whom the labour 
regulations are supposed to help, because of  the socioeconomic realities in the developing 
countries. For more details on this argument, see Hasnat (1995). 
47They have already made some success in this direction in the successive meetings of the 
Uruguay round. In Singapore in December 1996, the members of the WTO agreed to respect 
social labour standards, but leaving the responsibility for monitoring the implementation of 
those standards to the International Labour Organization (ILO) rather than the WTO 
(Windfuhr, 1997; Castle et al., 1998).‎‎‎‎‎‎‎‎‎‎ 
48 The public sector employment as a percentage of total national labour force is much 
higher; e.g., in Kuwait, 91% of the nationals were employed by the public sector, which 
pays two to three times more than market wages (UNESCWA, 1997a). 
49 The year in brackets indicates the starting date of the programme. 
50 In Egypt, for example, 44.4% of the new entrants in the labour market were absorbed in 
the public sector over the period 1976-1986 (UNESCWA, 1997a, p. 87). 
51 For example, in Jordan, the public sector employment decreased from 50% (and 45% in 
some estimates) in 1987 to 33.7% in 1993 (UNESCWA, 1997a, p.79).  
52 For Egypt, for example, see the estimates of  the Institute of National Planning (1994) and 
Korayem (1994); and for Jordan and Yemen, see the estimates in UNESCWA (1997b).   
53 For example, there are individual studies that estimated poverty in Bahrain (Abdel-
Khalek, 1987a) and in Sudan (Abdel-Kader, 1994). 
54 This includes main food grains, like wheat, coarse grains  and rice. 
55 However, the rise in their cost of living as consumers will probably be less than in the 
case of the urban population, since part of their exportable crops can be used for own-
consumption. In addition, they can also cultivate different food products on a small scale for 
their own consumption and thus avoid some of the food price increases due to globalization.  
56 For Somalia, see the Arab League et al., 1999, Appendix Table 8/3.   55 
                                                                                                                                      
57 On 3 March 1993, two hundred thousand Indian farmers rallied in Delhi to protest GATT 
proposals to extend patent protection to seed and agricultural chemical companies 
(Schaeffer, 1997). 
58 For example, a variety of Turkish barley was donated to US farmers to combat a yellow 
dwarf virus, saving US farmers $150 million a year in crop losses (Schaeffer, 1997, p. 205). 
59 With the exception of the East and East-South Asian countries, the income gap between 
developed and developing countries is wide and getting wider. For example, the average per 
capita income of the Group of Seven Industrialized countries (G-7) was 20 times that of the 
world￿s poorest seven countries in 1965, and became 39 times as much in 1995. In Africa, 
the average per capita income is only 7% of that of the industrial countries.  In Latin 
America, average per capita income has fallen from over one- third of the level in the 
industrial countries in the late 1970￿s to one-quarter in the nineties (Ricupero, 1997). 
60 For example, by reducing tariffs to zero, NAFTA will cut US revenues by about $4 billion 
a year, and cut tax revenues for Canada and Mexico by about $3 billion (Schaeffer, 1997). 
61 The weakening of the social safety net at the national level is taking place in the 
developed countries also, where social services provided to the poor and the elderly have 
deteriorated over the last decade. 
62 This section is partly based on Korayem (2000).  
63 It is also mentioned that most of the former Soviet block are joining this bottom level 
category  (Mittelman, 1997).  
64 The severe crisis that the NICs in South East Asia and Latin America have experienced 
showed how vulnerable those countries are economically and socially, despite their 
successful integration into the global economy, as frequently referred to in the literature. 
65 Choosing the appropriate technology for the developing countries, which is not 
necessarily the latest technology,  is advocated by other economists; e.g., Lall (1995).  
66 This is also referred to as Pan Arab Free Trade Area (PAFTA) in some sources.  
67 As an example of the deficiencies in the research environment that exists in the Third 
World countries, see the study on  The Research Environment in Egypt (Korayem, 1999). 
68 For example, it is not a coincidence that countries like India and Pakistan, despite their 
meager resources and large population, have been able to produce scientists who have 
successfully built the atomic bomb. Despite our condemnation of the production of atomic 
bombs or any other weapons of mass destruction, one cannot disregard the implied scientific 
achievement of this act. There are also considerable achievements in social sciences (such as 
in economics), as revealed by the respectable publications of  Indian and Pakistani scholars. 
This respectable performance in both hard and social sciences  is an indicator for the 
competitive education infrastructure that the two countries have built successfully despite 
financial constraints.   
69 On this point, see Cardoso (1996). 
70 Yamazawa (2000) makes a similar suggestion for the East Asian economies to meet the 
challenges of a changing global environment. But Calvo et al (1996) advocate liberalizing 
outflows and controlling inflows.  
71 Tobin suggests that  the People￿s Republic of China proved immune to the ￿Asian flu￿ 
because it restricts the convertibility of its currency. The right to convert renminbi funds into 
foreign currency is strictly given only to foreigners who have earned them through 
commercial transactions. However, China continues to top the list of countries attracting 
FDI.    56 
                                                                                                                                      
72 See Arab League et al. (1996 and 1999; Ch.7) for details. 
73 It consists of the USA, Canada and Mexico. 
74 Many of the cited benefits are derived from Rodgers (1998). 
75 Regional trading blocs conflict with the Most Favored Nations (MFN) Principle of the 
GATT. However, Article XXIV of the GATT makes an exception for preferential trading 
arrangements provided: (a) the agreement eliminates tariffs and other restrictions on 
￿substantially all the trade￿ among the member countries of the trading bloc within ￿a 
reasonable period of time￿, and (b) the remaining barriers to trade with non-members of the 
bloc are no more restrictive ￿on average￿ than barriers in place prior to the bloc￿s formation. 
The aim of these conditions is to ensure that trade creation exceeds trade diversion 
(Rodgers, 1998, p. 213).  
76This is a scheme for the STABilization of EXport earnings established under the Lome 
Treaty.  
77 The severely indebted countries are: Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania and Syria (World Bank, 
2000b). To these, one should add Somalia as a member of the League of Arab States. 
78For example, the industrialized countries place a 0.1% tariff on raw rubber from the 
developing countries, but a  16.5% tariff on rubber footwear (Schaeffer, 1997, p. 200).  
79 Those countries are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey. 
80 The daily newspaper Al-Ahram, September 27 1999, Cairo (in Arabic). 
81 See the statement of Ambassador Betty King, the US Representative on the United 
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